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ABSTRACT 
 Despite the efforts of the United States and its allies, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) has defiantly refused to abandon its nuclear ambitions. 
Today, as its nuclear capabilities continue to improve, the risk of rogue nuclear aspirants 
turning to Pyongyang for nuclear-related support increases as well. Furthermore, seeing 
as the DPRK relies heavily on illicit revenue from a wide spectrum of illegal trafficking 
for economic survival, it is within the realm of possibility that it may seek to become the 
next transnational supplier of nuclear weapons-related resources. Focusing specifically on 
targeting North Korea’s illicit supply chains, this thesis argues that United States Special 
Operations Forces’ unique non-kinetic attributes can be employed to contribute to the 
nonproliferation regime’s efforts to prevent the DPRK from proliferating nuclear material 
and technology to rogue countries. This study analytically examines how historic illicit 
nuclear trafficking networks and operations managed to remain hidden from intelligence 
agencies and nonproliferation organizations and draws parallels to the DPRK’s illicit 
nuclear trafficking networks. Ultimately, this study frames these parallels as potential 
vulnerabilities that SOF can target in order to uncover North Korea’s illicit nuclear 
supply chains and prevent it from becoming the next A.Q. Khan network. 
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Over the last three decades, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 
leveraged its nuclear weapons program to obtain critical aid to support its failing economy 
and starving population, garner geopolitical clout, and to establish itself as a legitimate 
regime and nuclear power.1 Regardless of its intent, North Korea’s growing nuclear 
capability, paired with its increasingly hostile acts of defiance towards international law, 
has made the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program a serious source of global instability. Over 
the past quarter century, the United States and the international community have 
collaborated to uncover, target, and thwart the illicit smuggling networks that North Korea 
uses to support its nuclear weapons program. These efforts play an integral role in global 
nuclear nonproliferation, as the DPRK is likely to use these very illicit supply chains to 
support other rogue nuclear aspirants. The North has continuously “defied, stymied, 
deferred or circumvented repeated efforts by allies, adversaries, and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inhibit its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ensure 
Pyongyang’s compliance with its declared non-proliferation obligations.”2 As a result, it 
is commonly believed that North Korea will never abandon its nuclear weapons program 
and that all efforts should be shifted towards containing the regional effects of North 
Korea’s nuclearization and preventing the “next round of proliferation.”3 
Historically, every unsanctioned nuclear weapons program has relied extensively 
on illicit supply chains to obtain critical material and technology from foreign sources.4 
Arguably the most prominent example is the “Khan Network,” which Abdul Qadeer Khan 
                                                 
1 Benjamin Habib, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme and the Maintenance of the Songun 
System,” Pacific Review 24, no. 1 (2011): 44, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2011.554992. 
2 Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (New 
York: Routledge, 2017), 13. 
3 Gregory L. Schulte, “Stopping Proliferation before It Starts: How to Prevent the Next Nuclear 
Wave,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 4 (2010): 95, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25680982. 
4 Matthew Bunn et al., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), 23. 
2 
initially created in 1970 to support Pakistan’s gas-centrifuge program. He was forced to 
rely heavily on foreign assistance for critical material and technology due to Pakistan’s 
weak industrial infrastructure. More specifically, the foundation of his nuclear trafficking 
operations involved the use of foreign businessmen and nuclear experts to import goods 
and technology from foreign countries. He then used this “extensive collection of sensitive 
information that he stole or otherwise acquired from Europe” to develop his country’s gas 
centrifuge program.5 By the late 1990s, this operation evolved into a transnational 
smuggling network through which nuclear aspirants could purchase fully-constructed gas 
centrifuges, designs for nuclear weapons and related facilities, as well as weapons-grade 
uranium. Prior to its dismantling in 2004, the Khan network provided nuclear support to 
Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Additionally, according to Albright and Hinderstein, despite 
the absence of substantial evidence to date, it is also possible that Khan provided nuclear 
weapons-related support to terrorist organizations in Afghanistan as well.6 The discovery 
of his nuclear smuggling ring not only served as a serious wake up call to the international 
community, but it also provided invaluable insight into the composition of illicit nuclear 
smuggling networks and the methods they employed to be one step ahead of 
nonproliferation efforts.7  
According to Braun and Chyba, in response to the discovery of the A.Q. Khan’s 
network, former U.S. President Bush implemented a variety of initiatives developed by the 
nonproliferation regime designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons-related 
materials and technology. These initiatives included economic sanctions, heightened 
export and border control measures, international agreements, and the creation of multiple 
unilateral and multilateral organizations designed to target illicit networks and nuclear 
                                                 
5 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The AQ Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and 
Implications for Nonproliferation Efforts,” Strategic Insights 5, no. 6 (2006): 1. 
6 Albright and Hinderstein, 2. 
7 Molly MacCalman, “AQ Khan Nuclear Smuggling Network,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 
(2016): 114–15, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1506. 
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trafficking operations.8 Sanctions were designed to make it increasingly difficult and 
expensive for North Korea to acquire resources for its nuclear weapons program, while 
international agreements, such as the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, 
declared it a crime to provide assistance to non-state actors seeking nuclear, biological, 
chemical, or missile technologies. The creation of initiatives such as the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), along with the 
implementation of enhanced export-control measures, represent multinational efforts to 
enforce “supply-side controls” to impede North Korea’s ability to obtain and export nuclear 
resources.9 These control measures continue to be a major component of the U.S. and 
nonproliferation regime’s strategy towards the North today.  
While these initiatives put a significant amount of pressure on North Korea, they 
ultimately failed to sever its illicit nuclear supply chains and halt the forward progress of 
its nuclear weapons program. Over the years, the DPRK developed innovative methods to 
circumvent the aims of these control measures.10 Today, Pyongyang allegedly possesses 
the ability to execute a nuclear attack on Japan, South Korea, and potentially, the 
continental U.S.11 Additionally, the DPRK made unprecedented progress in its ballistic 
missile program in 2017, which involved three significant Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) tests. Noteworthy examples include the testing of the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-
15 missiles, which demonstrated North Korea’s ability to target the continental U.S. 
Following these missiles tests, North Korean President Kim Jong-Un publicly announced 
that his aspirations of becoming a nuclear state were now complete.12 Pyongyang’s self-
                                                 
8 Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation regime,” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 38, https://www-jstor-
org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/4137585. 
9 Bunn et al., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology, 10–12. 
10 Mikael Weissmann, “Keeping Alive: Understanding North Korea’s Supply Lines and the Potential 
Role of Sanctions,” The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, no. 6 (2014): 16, http://fhs.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:760113/FULLTEXT02.pdf. 
11 Joshua Stanton, Sung-Yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner, “Getting Tough on North Korea: How to Hit 
Pyongyang Where It Hurts,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 3 (2017): 65. 
12 Daniel Salisbury, “North Korea’s Missile Programme and Supply-Side Controls: Lessons for 
Countering Illicit Procurement,” RUSI Journal 163, no. 4 (2018): 51, https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1080/
03071847.2018.1529897. 
4 
proclamation as a nuclear state has created growing nuclear proliferation concerns since it 
has historically demonstrated the willingness and ability to provide critical materials and 
technology with “nuclear-weapons potential” to other countries aspiring to follow suit and 
develop prohibited programs.13  
B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Inherent to the nuclear counterproliferation problem set is the constant struggle 
between those enforcing nonproliferation control measures and those working to 
circumvent them. Furthermore, the constant evolution of technology requires an effective 
nonproliferation strategy to be “as creative, adaptive, and global” as the adversaries, in this 
case, those desiring to facilitate illicit nuclear proliferation.14 Nonproliferation subject 
matter experts generally agree that counterproliferation efforts for the DPRK must use a 
holistic approach, involving the collective application and efforts of intelligence agencies, 
law enforcement, export control measures, interdiction operations, customs regulations, 
financial controls, private companies, and foreign governments and intelligence 
agencies.15 Unfortunately, the fact that the DPRK’s nuclear program is still thriving today, 
despite multiple decades of collaboration among the aforementioned entities, is a clear 
indicator that the current strategy towards North Korea is inadequate. Therefore, it is 
imperative for the U.S. Government (USG), all organizations focused on global 
nonproliferation efforts, strategists, and academics to identify ways to enhance the current 
approach to the DPRK problem set.  
This thesis focuses on a far more worrisome problem than North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program: that is, the possibility of others following in the footsteps of countries 
such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan to develop prohibited nuclear weapons 
programs utilizing outside support through illicit nuclear trade. Due to Pyongyang’s 
growing ability to support its own nuclear program indigenously, as well as the indicators 
of its willingness to provide nuclear-related support to non-state and state actors, this study 
                                                 
13 Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security, 14. 
14 Bunn et al., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology, 3. 
15 Bunn et al., 3. 
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argues that it is critical for all those involved in nonproliferation efforts to consider the 
grave possibility that the DPRK may develop the next A.Q. Khan network.16  
In recent years, Pyongyang has conducted as many as six nuclear tests and multiple 
ballistic missile tests indicating that it can now range the continental US. Furthermore, it 
has publicly declared that it is now capable of counterattacking any nuclear attack from the 
U.S.17 This study will examine all relevant aspects of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons 
program and its illicit nuclear supply chains in order to expose potential vulnerabilities 
“that can be targeted to halt its ability to support its nuclear program and those of future 
nuclear aspirants. Finally, this thesis will explore the application of a unique instrument of 
national power that has been relatively absent in previous nonproliferation efforts to target 
these vulnerabilities: the United States Special Operations Force (USSOF).  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The discovery and dismantling of the A.Q. Khan network continues to be one of 
the greatest success stories in the realm of counterproliferation and counter weapons of 
mass destruction. However, according to Albright, the successes critical to taking down 
this network depended largely on luck, interdiction operations, and cargo seizures, all of 
which constitute the last line of defense with regards to countering nuclear proliferation. 
He goes on to state “Sorely missing are successful strategies to detect and stop illicit trade 
before it occurs. Bolstering these first lines of defense is critical to preventing illicit nuclear 
trade.”18 Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), foreign intelligence agencies, 
and the IAEA were instrumental in uncovering nuclear trafficking networks such as the 
Khan Network, the employment of other instruments of national power may improve the 
“first lines of defense” referenced by Albright. As mentioned before, this thesis will focus 
on the application of USSOF. Thus, the question central to my research is as follows: “How 
can Special Operations Forces (SOF) augment current efforts to uncover North Korea’s 
                                                 
16 Bunn et al., 63. 
17 Arms Control Association, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” 
accessed April 16, 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2009. 
18 David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New 
York City: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 12. 
6 
illicit nuclear supply chains in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons-related 
resources to future aspirants?” Additional research questions which facilitate the 
investigation of my primary research include:  
1. What are the key components of the current counterproliferation strategy 
against the DPRK? 
2. What are the vulnerabilities of this strategy and why has it been 
unsuccessful in thwarting North Korea’s illicit nuclear trade networks?  
3. What countries have provided North Korea with critical nuclear support 
via illicit trade networks? To what extent can we influence, deter, or 
coerce these countries into halting this support?  
4. To what extent does the DPRK rely on importing resources to support its 
nuclear weapons program? To what degree is it able to indigenously 
support its nuclear weapons program?   
5. Which countries are enabling the DPRK to facilitate its illicit nuclear 
trafficking operations? Why? 
6. What are the key vulnerabilities in North Korea’s illicit nuclear supply 
chains?  
7. What are the DPRK’s current nuclear and ballistic capabilities?  
8. Which countries may turn to North Korea for nuclear weapons-related 
support in the future?  
9. What unique operational platforms can USSOF utilize in order to augment 
the current strategy towards North Korea?  
10. How can SOF facilitate the synchronization of the initiatives of the entities 
involved in nonproliferation efforts against North Korea?  
7 
11. Which foreign partner forces should USSOF focus its efforts on with 
regard to enhancing counterproliferation and counter weapons of mass 
destruction capabilities?  
12. What are some instances in which illicit nuclear trafficking networks were 
successfully uncovered and thwarted? What fundamental aspects 
contributed to these successes? 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
To start this study, my preliminary hypothesis is as follows: With its authorities, as 
well as unique mission set and non-kinetic attributes, USSOF can contribute significantly 
to the efforts to uncover North Korea’s nuclear supply chains. More specifically, SOF 
would be most effective if employed through an indigenous approach with key partner 
forces during phase zero, prior to the employment of last resort measures, such as 
interdiction operations. The purpose of this study is not to suggest that SOF should be an 
independent component among the many nonproliferation initiatives currently employed. 
Rather, the primary objective of this thesis is to demonstrate how USSOF can augment and 
enhance the nonproliferation regime’s efforts to hinder the forward progress of the DPRK’s 
nuclear weapons program and to prevent it from becoming the next major proliferator of 
illicit nuclear resources.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Today, the DPRK has become the “preeminent target for supply-side controls” and 
its illicit smuggling networks are a prominent subject of research in the realm of global 
nonproliferation.19 Scholars propose a wide variety of approaches for analyzing potential 
weaknesses within North Korea’s nuclear supply chains and the solutions put forth to 
thwart these illicit smuggling networks. This literature review will provide a broad 
overview of these approaches, highlighting the distinguishing characteristics and focus of 
each scholar’s perspective. It is important to note that virtually all of the proposals put forth 
                                                 
19 Bunn et al., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology, 15. 
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are currently employed to a certain degree and are encompassed within the current 
international nonproliferation strategy. However, scholars diverge in their opinions on 
which component of the strategy proves critical for the detection of illicit nuclear 
smuggling networks. Various perspectives also emerge in regard to what must be done to 
address the shortcomings of each approach.  
Ultimately, the key purpose of this literature review is to clearly demonstrate SOF’s 
absence from virtually all initiatives employed to uncover the DPRK’s nuclear supply 
chains and thwart its illicit nuclear trafficking operations. This shortcoming will be the 
point of departure for the discussion of integrating USSOF into the current 
counterproliferation strategy towards North Korea.  
1. Enhancing Export Control Measures 
Bunn et al. posit that the key to the early detection of illicit nuclear smuggling 
networks is the implementation of export-control assistance programs to educate key 
countries on proliferation issues and to train them on procedures that reduce illicit 
trafficking activities. They suggest that the governments of these countries should subject 
their economic transportation infrastructure to international peer review by countries with 
more developed export controls, customs operations, and enforcement processes in order 
to share invaluable knowledge regarding the screening and flagging of illicit trade. More 
specifically, the authors propose the creation of an Export Control Task Force (ECTF) 
comprised of members of organizations such as the NSG and PSI in order to facilitate 
multilateral efforts to combat illicit nuclear trafficking. This task force would establish 
export standards and reporting procedures, monitor compliance, and collaborate on efforts 
to detect and target illegal nuclear trafficking.20 Peter Crail also advocates this approach 
by explaining that there are a variety of opportunities to facilitate engagements between 
the governments of key nations through the UNSCR 1540 and the multitude of 
organizations involved in regional export controls. The ultimate purpose of these 
engagements would be to educate and increase awareness of extraterritorial laws, 
                                                 
20 Bunn et al., 355–56. 
9 
proliferation risks, and internal compliance processes.21 Additionally, Albright, Brannan, 
and Stricker concur with this perspective when they assert that the key to the early detection 
of Pyongyang’s nuclear trafficking operations is increased cooperation between developed 
and developing countries. They point out that financial institutions in developed countries 
employ screening systems that reference a database of names, entities, and banned material 
to flag suspicious transactions. Whenever suspicious activity is identified, the financial 
institution is then able to freeze or deny the transaction and subsequently report the activity 
to authorities in order to track potential traffickers and illuminate illegal trade networks. 
Additionally, banks in developed countries are required by law to report suspicious and 
potential illegal activity to the authorities. Thus, the authors’ fundamental point is that there 
must be increased cooperation in this regard since North Korea exploits developing 
countries in order to maintain and expand its illicit nuclear trafficking networks.22 
2. Increase Intelligence Sharing 
Another approach focuses on the critical need to increase intelligence sharing 
among all of the U.S. and international organizations involved in nonproliferation efforts 
against North Korea. According to Bunn et al., despite the myriad of organizations 
designed to target and uncover North Korea’s nuclear supply chains, there is no single 
organization responsible for consolidating and disseminating valuable intelligence that can 
enhance each organization’s respective initiatives. They assert that it is critical to not only 
increase intelligence sharing between U.S. and multinational organizations, but also with 
entitles such as the IAEA and the UN Expert Panel in North Korea in order to facilitate the 
implementation of deterrence measures for North Korea.23 Boureston and Russell assert 
that it is imperative for regulatory bodies and law enforcement organizations to share 
information on industry, business transactions, suspicious enquiries, and dubious bid offers 
                                                 
21 Peter Crail, “Measuring Nuclear Export Controls in Nuclear-Powered Nations and Nuclear 
Aspirants,” Nuclear Scholars Initiative, 2013, 89. 
22 David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Scheel Stricker, “Detecting and Disrupting Illicit 
Nuclear Trade After AQ Khan,” Washington Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2010): 97, https://doi.org/10.1080/
01636601003673857. 
23 Bunn et al., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology, 357. 
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in order to increase opportunities to detect attempted and completed sales of illicit 
materials.24 Rens Lee adds that intelligence on nuclear trade or theft can help determine 
where the illicit material originated, where it is headed, and who the likely customers are. 
According to Lee, this will significantly increase the chances of recovering illicit nuclear 
material before it reaches the end user due to the fact that such resources are often pushed 
into smuggling channels prior to the establishment of a buyer.25 Albright, Bannan, and 
Stricker also address the need for increased intelligence collaboration between government 
and industry in countries with high-tech manufacturing companies capable of producing 
and exporting dual-use items. The majority of these manufacturing companies lack 
intelligence departments and are therefore, unable to determine if they are inadvertently 
supporting illicit trade. Likewise, governments lack information on the flow of dual use 
products, which can be provided by the manufacturers and shipping companies.26 
Ultimately, according to these scholars, enhanced intelligence collaboration among all 
elements is the key to uncovering North Korea’s nuclear supply chains.  
3. Increased Security Measures 
Another prominent focus area explored forth by scholars is the need to increase 
security measures not only for physical nuclear material, but also on technical know-how 
and sensitive data as well. Albright, Brannan, and Stricker expound upon this perspective 
when they explain that there must be concerted efforts by the governments of recognized 
nuclear states to enhance protection measures for nuclear material and information. Fissile 
material facilities must be protected from infiltration and standardized protocols must be 
implemented in order to prevent personnel with access to these facilities from stealing 
critical nuclear material or sensitive information.27 Ultimately, cooperative efforts to 
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standardize protection and security measures will degrade North Korea’s illicit nuclear 
trade network by making it increasingly difficult to obtain and distribute sensitive material 
and information to buyers on the nuclear black market.  
4. Targeting China 
Another perspective focuses on China’s role in North Korea’s illicit nuclear 
smuggling network. John Park and Jim Walsh explore this approach by first investigating 
why economic sanctions have had marginal effects on North Korea’s ability to obtain illicit 
material and resources. Since the DPRK conducts the majority of its economic trade with 
China, sanctions barring UN members from trading with North Korea have had very little 
impact on both its economy and its ability to traffic illicit material.28 Interestingly, Park 
and Walsh go on to posit that the sanctions actually have had an opposite effect; Pyongyang 
responded to the sanctions by paying more money for illicit trafficking operations to 
compensate for the higher risk involved with doing business with North Korea. This, in 
turn, attracted higher-caliber Chinese firms capable of acquiring not only more but also 
higher quality illicit material with a greater ability to circumvent restrictions emplaced by 
the sanctions.29 As a result, Park and Welsh assert that the international community should 
target the Chinese middlemen facilitating North Korea’s illicit smuggling network by 
leveraging China’s existing anti-corruption efforts. Efforts to track down traffickers and 
illegal trade networks can be improved by encouraging Chinese officials to consistently 
administer harsh punishment for Chinese businesses involved in illicit trade and by offering 
incentives for information leading to the uncovering of these procurement networks.30 
Stanton, Lee, and Klinger concur with this strategy and add that Chinese banks and trading 
companies have demonstrated that they value access to the American economy over their 
business relationships with Pyongyang. In light of this, they propose that the U.S. should 
fine and sanction Chinese banks and trading companies that are known to maintain 
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financial relationships with North Korea and fail to report suspicious transactions to the 
U.S. Treasury Department. Furthermore, the authors suggest that the U.S. should increase 
pressure on Beijing to demand inspections of suspicious exports and deny the resupply and 
refuel requests for North Korean vessels suspected of conducting illicit trade.31 Ultimately, 
the authors identify Chinese banks and middlemen as well as Beijing’s desire to maintain 
economic ties with the U.S. as key vulnerabilities in Pyongyang’s illicit nuclear trade 
network.  
5. Targeting the Network’s “Resiliency” 
Another line of thought suggests that the key to the early detection of North Korea’s 
illicit networks is targeting internal organizational aspects that enable them to circumvent 
sanctions and other restrictive supply control measures. Aaron Arnold asserts that one 
major flaw in the current approach to exposing North Korea’s illicit nuclear trade network 
is the failure to account for its ability to adapt to a restrictive economic environment.32 He 
arguies that as a result, the counterproliferation measures developed and implemented by 
the U.S. and nonproliferation regime are inherently reactive in nature, proving to be one of 
the primary reasons why North Korea has been able to circumvent economic obstacles. He 
goes on to assert that the solution is to identify and target the internal attributes that allow 
the networks to adapt and operate in environments full of risk and uncertainty. He dubs 
these collective internal attributes as the “resiliency” of an illicit network.33 According to 
Arnold, such attributes include the network’s access to acquisition capabilities, technical 
expertise, innovation, and financial capital.34 To conclude, Arnold’s stance is that the 
international community must develop a more proactive approach by targeting the North 
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Korea’s informational and economic connections outside of its borders and deterring them 
from facilitating illegal nuclear trafficking operations.  
6. Application of USSOF 
The approaches put forth by these scholars effectively identify shortcomings in the 
current North Korea counterproliferation strategy and highlight potential vulnerabilities 
within the DPRK’s illicit nuclear smuggling network. Although they address the 
employment of various diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national 
power, they fail to consider the use of the military as a means to uncover North Korea’s 
illicit nuclear supply chains. One of SOF’s directed core activities from the United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is to augment USG efforts to “curtail the 
development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, 
related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery by states and non-state 
actors.”35 This aspect of SOF’s mission clearly aligns with many of the objectives of the 
various nonproliferation organizations involved in the North Korea problem set. 
Additionally, the majority of the proposed solutions revolve around the assertion that there 
must be increased cooperation among key nations, unilateral, and multilateral 
organizations involved in nonproliferation efforts against the DPRK. According to Joint 
Publication 3-05 (Special Operations Forces),  
SOF’s unique capabilities support the U.S. military instrument of national 
power and support the USG departments and agencies, partner nations, or 
intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization [NATO]) to protect and advance national security interests, 
deter conflict, and shape regional security.36  
USSOF’s unique non-kinetic attributes make it a powerful means to facilitate the 
implementation of foreign policy, develop and maintain diplomatic relationships with 
foreign partners, and contribute to initiatives and operations that protect national interests 
across the globe. As mentioned before, many countries are vulnerable to being exploited 
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by North Korea’s illicit nuclear trafficking operations due to their lack of export control 
measures as well as capabilities related to border and port security. One of the major ways 
in which SOF can complement nonproliferation efforts is by leveraging its historic 
relationships with foreign partners through its Building Partner Capacity (BPC). SOF could 
create a multitude of opportunities to connect key partner forces with nonproliferation 
organizations seeking to enhance vulnerable countries’ border control capabilities. 
Additionally, SOF could also create opportunities to facilitate collaboration among key 
countries that are vulnerable to North Korea’s trafficking operations. Such opportunities 
have the potential to disrupt the DPRK’s transnational shipment of illicit nuclear resources. 
Due to political sensitives and administrative obstacles that may prevent SOF from 
working directly with many of the entities involved in the NK nonproliferation problem 
set, USSOF can certainly leverage its unique aspects and capabilities to enhance and 
facilitate their initiatives, particularly those that involve the integration of key partner 
forces. For example, the Intelligence Community (IC) could leverage SOF’s global 
presence as a means to fill intelligence gaps, provide updated data on monitored areas of 
interest, or intelligence needed by other nonproliferation organizations to facilitate their 
respective counterproliferation initiatives and operations. SOF could also provide similar 
intelligence support to select U.S. and international entities involved in the North Korea 
counterproliferation mission set to synchronize efforts to uncover nuclear supply chains. 
Again, while there are complications preventing entities involved in nonproliferation 
efforts from working with each other as well as with SOF, providing all parties with 
accurate assessments and intelligence could significantly enhance their initiatives. These 
are just a few of the many potential means of integrating SOF that will be addressed in this 
study. As stated before, the key to an effective counterproliferation strategy is the early 
detection of illicit smuggling networks prior to last resort measures such as physical 
interdiction operations. This study will focus specifically on the application of SOF during 
this pre-interdiction phase, which the SOF community commonly refers to as phase-zero.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to explore how SOF can employ its mission set 
and unique non-kinetic capabilities to contribute to the nonproliferation community’s 
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efforts to uncover the DPRK’s illicit nuclear supply chains in order to prevent it from 
becoming the next major proliferator of nuclear weapons-related resources to rogue 
countries. As previously mentioned, this study will focus solely on the application on SOF 
during phase zero prior to any kinetic interdiction operations.  
My research methodology is qualitative in nature and will involve the thorough 
examination of historic examples of countries obtaining prohibited nuclear weapons 
programs through the use of illicit nuclear procurement networks. The case studies which 
this thesis will investigate will consist of Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. However, before 
presenting the case studies, I will first provide several areas of context in order to properly 
frame the DPRK problem set. An overview of the history of North Korea’s nuclear weapon 
program will illustrate the trials and tribulations that the country had to overcome in order 
to obtain its nuclear capability. As will be discussed later, this is critical as it establishes 
the basis for the argument that Pyongyang is unlikely to forfeit its nuclear weapons. The 
initial portion of this thesis will familiarize the reader with the basic characteristics of illicit 
nuclear trafficking networks and then demonstrate how they appear in North Korea’s 
trafficking operations. A thorough understanding of these operations will be achieved with 
an overview of the DPRK’s history of trafficking illicit items, ranging from drugs and 
counterfeit items to conventional weaponry and ballistic missiles. This will help further 
frame the problem as North Korea’s reliance on illicit trafficking for economic survival 
provides strong reason to believe that it may turn to nuclear material sales for increased 
illegal revenue in the future.  
Once the problem is properly framed and the basis for the key assumptions are 
established, I will present three case studies examining Pakistan’s, Iraq’s, and Iran’s use of 
illicit nuclear networks. The examination of these case studies will serve to identify the key 
trafficking methods and nuclear supply chain infrastructure characteristics that enabled 
these three countries to circumvent nonproliferation efforts. If these operational procedures 
and infrastructure characteristics enabled these countries to develop prohibited nuclear 
programs despite the efforts of the U.S. and the nonproliferation regime, then it is highly 
likely that North Korea will adopt and implement these identified factors. More 
importantly, this thesis will make the argument that Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran could not have 
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achieved their nuclear aspirations without the implementation of these key attributes. 
Therefore, these attributes can also be viewed as vulnerabilities that if targeted and 
neutralized, would theoretically make trafficking operations impossible.  
Finally, with the identification of these key procedures and infrastructure attributes 
are identified, I will then determine how they manifest themselves in the DPRK’s illicit 
nuclear supply chains based on available information. As previously mentioned, these will 
serve as potential vulnerabilities within North Korea’s illicit nuclear trafficking operations. 
I will then highlight the unique attributes of USSOF that are relevant to the DPRK 
counterproliferation problem set and discuss the application of its non-kinetic capabilities 
to target these vulnerabilities. This section will not only discuss how SOF can target the 
vulnerabilities, but also how it can enhance the efforts of those involved in nonproliferation 
efforts against the DPRK. This chapter will answer my original research question of how 
USSOF can be employed to contribute to efforts to uncover North Korea’s nuclear supply 
chains.  
G. LIMITS OF RESEARCH AND ASSUMPTIONS 
While the counterproliferation problem set addresses chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear weapons, I have intentionally narrowed the focus of this study to 
the proliferation of resources, material, and technology meant to support unsanctioned 
nuclear weapons programs. Additionally, while my research can be applied to a number of 
suspected nuclear aspirants that currently exist, I will focus solely on how USSOF can be 
integrated into efforts to uncover the DPRK’s nuclear supply chains.  
With the acknowledgement that each armed service’s SOF element is inherently 
different in terms of operational purpose, capabilities, and mission set, I will focus on the 
fact that in today’s Operating Environment (OE), virtually all USSOF elements operating 
in the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) 
predominantly utilize Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Forces Assistance 
(SFA) as the primary means to achieve our Nation’s security objectives by, with, and 
through key partner forces. For the sake of this study, the delineation between sister service 
SOF elements operating in the INDOPACOM AOR is determined by the type of partner 
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nation force (Army, Navy, Air Force, Law Enforcement, etc.) that they are working with 
rather than service-specific mission sets.  
Lastly, although USSOF elements maintain a physical interdiction capability 
through its Direct Action (DA) core task, I focus solely upon SOF’s non-kinetic capabilities 
and how they can be integrated into efforts to uncover the DPRK’s nuclear supply chains. 
Additionally, I will narrow the focus of USSOF application to phase-zero in order to 
determine how SOF can enhance efforts to illuminate the DPRK’s illicit nuclear trafficking 
networks through early detection.  
H. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II of this thesis will provide context for my research question by delving 
into the history of the DPRK’s nuclear program as well as providing an overview of its 
current nuclear and ballistic capabilities. This history will not only present the reader with 
a historic example of how a nuclear aspirant utilized illicit trafficking networks to 
circumvent nonproliferation control measures, but also, more importantly, illustrate the 
reoccurring patterns in Pyongyang’s political decisions and actions that enabled its nuclear 
program to survive through the years. As mentioned before, this will serve as the basis for 
the argument that Pyongyang has no intention of denuclearizing. Chapter III will serve to 
establish basic knowledge of the innerworkings of an illicit nuclear procurement network. 
This will facilitate the examination of the three case studies, as many of the key trafficking 
procedures and infrastructure attributes introduced in Chapter III will be mentioned during 
the case study assessment. Chapters IV and V will be the bulk of this study, entailing a 
thorough analysis of the use of illicit nuclear procurement networks in Pakistan, Iraq, and 
Iran for their respective development of nuclear weapons programs. The key attributes of 
each procurement network will then be applied to the DPRK case study in order to identify 
potential vulnerabilities that can be targeted by SOF. Chapter VI will provide the answer 
to my original research question as it will highlight the relevant attributes of SOF that make 
it an effective force to target the vulnerabilities identified in the previous chapter. Lastly, 
Chapter VII will conclude the thesis by summarizing my findings and identifying areas for 
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future research regarding the application of SOF to the DPRK counterproliferation problem 
set. 
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II. NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Over the past half-century, the DPRK has repeatedly challenged the world’s 
superpowers and firmly established itself as a prominent symbol of defiance on the 
international stage. Pollack, one of the most prominent experts on the DPRK, explains that 
this small “inward-looking regime” not only overcame seemingly impossible technical and 
logistical obstacles, but persevered through harsh deterrence strategies meant to stymie 
forward progress in its nuclear endeavors.37 Before analyzing the North Korea 
counterproliferation problem set, it is critical to understand how the country overcame such 
obstacles during its march towards its nuclear aspirations. This chapter will provide a 
chronological overview of the program’s history from the genesis of North Korea’s nuclear 
dream in the 1950s, to its self-proclamation status as a nuclear-state. Lastly, this synopsis 
will examine the protracted series of failed negotiations between the DPRK and the world’s 
nuclear superpowers, which were instrumental in the country’s ability to circumvent 
decades of attempts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.38  
B. THE HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
The DPRK’s nuclear journey started in the 1950s with its pursuit of peaceful 
indigenous nuclear power technology. According to Pollack, Kim Il-Sung believed that 
nuclear power was a “talisman that would affirm the country’s standing as an advanced 
scientific and industrial power.”39 The Soviet Union played a major role in supporting 
North Korea’s nuclear endeavors, and the two countries signed several collaborative 
agreements for joint undertakings aimed towards the peaceful use of nuclear science.40 
Key developments that took place during this decade include the establishment of nuclear 
research facilities and training of North Korean nuclear scientists, which proved integral 
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for the early development stages of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. Prominent 
examples include the conception of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, which would become 
the country’s primary plutonium production reactor, and the training of Seo Sang-Kuk, 
who would become one of the most prominent North Korean nuclear scientists associated 
with the its prohibited nuclear weapons program in the years to come.41 
During the 1960s, the accelerated growth of military power became central to North 
Korea’s strategy and state policy due to Kim Il-Sung’s long-term vision of the DPRK 
gaining equivalence with other major global powers.42 One of the major pillars of Kim’s 
vision comprised a robust nuclear capability. As a result, North Korea made significant 
progress in both nuclear infrastructure development and nuclear expertise through 
increased training of scientists and engineers. Pollack also points out that the U.S. steadily 
increased its deployment of nuclear capabilities to the Korean Peninsula during this 
timeframe. Naturally, this increased the DPRK’s self-awareness of its vulnerabilities and 
the need for a nuclear weapons program to defend itself from an American nuclear attack.43 
However, during the 1960s, the DPRK still lacked the know-how, technology, and 
resources to develop the facilities necessary to produce fissile nuclear material to reprocess 
spent nuclear fuel.44  
The 1970s marked a major milestone in the DPRK’s journey towards its nuclear 
aspirations due to the changing geopolitical dynamic with the U.S., Republic of Korea 
(ROK), Soviet Union, and China. First and foremost, North Korea continued to gain 
awareness of its shortcomings with regards to military power and geopolitical clout. As 
mentioned before, the Soviet Union played a significant role in supporting the DPRK’s 
nuclear program during its infancy. Unfortunately for Pyongyang, foreign relations 
between the U.S. and both the Soviet Union and China improved dramatically during this 
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time period, which in turn significantly decreased the DPRK’s leverage with the world’s 
major communist powers.45  
Additionally, the North became increasingly conscious of the ROK’s increase of 
economic and military power as well as its growing alliance with the U.S.46 Moltz and 
Mansourov explain that “the North Korean leadership regarded the policies of the Soviet 
Union and China with growing suspicion, knowing that in the near future these major allies 
of the DPRK could abandon or betray Pyongyang and establish diplomatic relations with 
the Republic of Korea.”47 Ultimately, rising suspicions and uneasiness cemented Kim’s 
view a nuclear weapons program as necessary for the Regime’s survival in the future.48 
Additionally, Kim Il-Sung began to plan for a leadership succession to Kim Jong-Il, and in 
his mind, a nuclear weapons program would facilitate a “consolidation of power.”49 
Regarding progress in the nuclear field, the North officially joined the IAEA in September 
of 1974. Although the DPRK did not sign the safeguards agreements, which would grant 
IAEA personnel access to North Korean nuclear facilities for inspection purposes, for 
another seven years and did not ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for another 
decade, this event proved noteworthy as it gave the North access to the technical data and 
expertise which became instrumental in the early developmental stages of the North 
Korean nuclear weapons program.50 By the end of the 1970s, the DPRK initiated the 
development of an indigenous 5 MWe graphite-moderated reactor, which would ultimately 
become the key facility for producing fissile material for North Korean nuclear weapons 
in years to come. This project triggered suspicions among U.S. and Soviet intelligence 
experts that the DPRK was pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program, especially because 
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the North Koreans initiated the project.51 In short, the key development during the 1970s 
was the entrenchment of a nuclear program into North Korea’s long-term strategy and the 
birth of its aspirations for a nuclear weapons program.  
Geopolitical developments during the 1980s further cemented Pyongyang’s belief 
that it was in dire need of a nuclear weapons program. As the DPRK’s suspicion of the 
diplomatic actions of the Soviet Union, China, and the U.S. continued to grow during this 
time period, North Korea increased pressure on the Soviet Union for nuclear support. 
Naturally, more evidence of a “military-oriented program” began to surface, which further 
increased suspicions among U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons experts as well.52 Notably, 
diplomatic tensions with the DPRK sharply rose towards the end of the 1980s. Communist 
rule in Eastern Europe collapsed and the ROK experienced major political and diplomatic 
progress with the U.S. Additionally, to exacerbate the situation, the U.S. was now actively 
seeking to implement United Nation Security Council sanctions on the DPRK in order to 
deter its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program.53 Although the DPRK’s final ratification 
of the NPT in December of 1985 was a sign of progress towards the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology, the 1980s closed with heightened tensions, which could have potentially led 
to a major crisis and overt hostilities.54  
The 1990s was a particularly tumultuous time period for nuclear diplomacy 
between the U.S. and the DPRK. At the beginning of the 1990s, it became increasingly 
apparent that the North had made significant progress in the technology required to support 
a nuclear weapons program. More specifically, international suspicions continued to rise 
as it became increasingly evident that North Korea’s indigenous reactor facility at 
Yongbyon was capable of reprocessing expended nuclear fuel into weapons-grade 
plutonium. The signs of a potential reprocessing capability along with evidence of 
increased fissile material accumulation made nuclear diplomacy with North Korea a central 
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component of U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations.55 As tensions further increased, on 
November 25, 1991, the DPRK agreed to sign the IAEA safeguards as long as the U.S. 
initiated the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, 
at the end of 1991, North and South Korea initiated separate nuclear talks in an effort to 
develop an “inter-Korean accord,” which ended with the signing of a Joint Declaration of 
the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on January 20, 1992. This declaration was 
essentially a vow by both sides to not “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, 
deploy, nor use nuclear weapons” and to not maintain nuclear reprocessing capabilities.56 
Lastly, the DPRK finally complied with IAEA safeguards, allowing experts into their 
nuclear facilities for inspection purposes. However, matters degraded severely when the 
IAEA inspectors identified significant discrepancies in the DPRK’s reported nuclear 
activities and on March 12, 1993, North Korea officially declared its withdrawal from the 
NPT.57 The situation steadily moved towards crisis when Hans Blix, the Director General 
of the IAEA, stated that there was strong evidence indicating that the DPRK was using its 
nuclear facilities to produce weapons-grade plutonium and that the North Koreans had 
intentionally impeded the IAEA’s ability to conduct its inspections.58 
The most notable development during the 1990s was former President Carter’s 
actions to diffuse this impending nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In June 1994, 
President Carter and Kim Il-Sung signed a U.S.-DPRK accord, officially known as the 
Agreed Framework. The key caveats of this agreement included a mandate to freeze the 
North Korean nuclear program and initiate the dismantling of all nuclear facilities 
associated with the indigenous 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon. In exchange, the U.S. would 
finance and support the construction of two 1000 MWe light-water reactors. Additionally, 
once a “significant portion” of the light-water reactors was complete, the DPRK would 
have to fully comply with IAEA safeguard obligations and allow the IAEA to verify the 
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“accuracy and completeness” of the dismantling process of Pyongyang’s nuclear program. 
Pollack states that the full implementation of this U.S.-DPRK accord was expected to take 
approximately ten years.59 
At the time, the Agreed Framework was viewed as a significant success in that it 
mended a year and half of degrading U.S.-DPRK relations and symbolized a momentous 
step towards the ultimate termination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. 
Furthermore, Albright explains that it effectively deescalated the impending nuclear crisis 
by impeding the North’s progress towards building a nuclear arsenal that threatened the 
U.S., South Korea, and Japan.60 However, during the implementation years, the renewed 
U.S.-DPRK relations began to deteriorate once again, as the two countries repeatedly 
disagreed on the completion of major milestones due to disparate interpretations of 
denuclearization. Additionally, Pyongyang openly complained about the delayed progress 
on the light water reactors and demanded compensation for the economic and energy losses 
resulting from its facilities being shut down. Pollack posits that by the end of the Clinton 
administration, the Agreed Framework made unsubstantial progress and the DPRK 
continued to deny direct access to its nuclear facilities, having yet to give up any fissile 
material or resources critical to its nuclear weapons program.61 
By 2002, U.S.–DPRK nuclear diplomacy experienced yet another major 
downswing due to intelligence indicating that North Korea had taken major steps to expand 
its centrifuge program. Consequently, in the fall of 2002, the Bush administration publicly 
accused Pyongyang of hiding a large-scale centrifuge program, eventually resulting in the 
collapse of the Agreed Framework and resumption of the DPRK’s plutonium-based nuclear 
weapons program by 2003.62 To make matters worse, the North also expelled all IAEA 
personnel from the country and publicly self-proclaimed that it was free from all IAEA 
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safeguards.63 In response to the DPRK’s actions, China initiated the Six-Party Talks in 
Beijing in August 2003, during which the world’s recognized nuclear powers and North 
Korea met to resolve this growing nuclear issue. Unfortunately, the DPRK would not agree 
to the demands of the U.S. for the irreversible dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear 
program and continued to demand compensation for the energy and economic losses 
endured during the Agreed Framework years. It is furthermore important to note that 
throughout these negotiations, North Korea firmly denied the existence of a nuclear 
weapons program and insisted that all of its facilities were designed for the peaceful use of 
nuclear power technology.64 However, according to Polack, in February 2005, the DPRK 
not only officially withdrew from the Six Party Talks, but also for the first time publicly 
declared that it possessed nuclear weapons. The North stated that it developed its nuclear 
weapons in response to the Bush administration’s policy of “isolating and crushing the 
DPRK.”65 However, the DPRK returned to the Six Party Talks that same year in September 
and pledged that it would abandon its nuclear program and weapons, return to the Treaty 
of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and comply with all IAEA safeguards. The 
negotiations culminated with all signatories agreeing to measures that would facilitate the 
peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.66 However, in 2006, the DPRK 
conducted its first underground nuclear weapon test, establishing itself as a nuclear state.67   
According to Pollack, in 2007, and for a portion of 2008, the DPRK returned to the 
negotiating table and agreed to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facility and permit IAEA 
personnel to verify its closure. The North agreed to provide the IAEA an accurate list of 
all of its nuclear programs. Although Pyongyang fulfilled a number of its commitments by 
mid-2008, it is important to note that the DPRK aimed to maintain its status as a nuclear 
state by intentionally evading steps to permanently render its nuclear facilities irreversibly 
inoperable. The North also did not take any steps to give up the fissile material in its 
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possession.68 As the end of the Bush administration approached, Pyongyang’s desire to 
exercise nuclear diplomacy waned and it became readily apparent that it fully intended to 
maintain the nuclear arsenal developed over the previous six years. 2009 brought yet 
another significant backslide in nuclear diplomacy as the DPRK reneged on every single 
nuclear-related commitment made during the Bush administration and established its status 
as a nuclear power. Pyongyang declared its inherent right to possess nuclear weapons and 
announced its intentions to move forward with its plutonium-based weapons program and 
explore uranium enrichment.69 To capitalize on these declarations, on May 25, 2009, the 
DPRK conducted a second nuclear test, claiming that it now had the capability to outfit a 
ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead.70 In response to the second underground nuclear 
test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1874, which expanded a variety of 
economic and financial restrictions on the DPRK and barred it from carrying out any 
further missile tests. Pyongyang defiantly announced its response to the resolution, which 
included weaponizing more plutonium and the continued development of its uranium 
enrichment program.71 In September 2009, Pyongyang publicly announced that it was 
nearing completion of its enrichment capabilities and by November 2010, revealed a 
facility that displayed evidence that the North had been covertly experimenting with 
enrichment and centrifuge technology for years.72  
Diplomatic relations with North Korea continued to be turbulent during the ensuing 
years due to escalated tensions between the Koreas, increased combined U.S.-ROK 
military exercises on the Peninsula, harsh economic sanctions, failed negotiations, 
prohibited missile tests, and three additional nuclear tests in 2013, 2014, and 2016, all of 
which led to increased condemnation of the DPRK by the international community. 
Pyongyang continued to demonstrate forward progress in its nuclear weapons program and 
ballistic missile capabilities despite the myriad of deterrence measures taken by the United 
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Nations. After another significant escalation of tensions in 2017, another effort to establish 
diplomacy was made between the U.S., DPRK, and the ROK. Notably, at the start of 2018, 
Kim Jong Un declared the official completion of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal, claiming that 
it now had the capability to counter any nuclear attack from the U.S. as well as its intent to 
mass produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. Now confident of its nuclear 
capabilities, the DPRK agreed to open a dialogue with the U.S. and ROK for nuclear 
negotiation. Despite multiple meetings among leadership and unprecedented summits in 
recent years, the U.S. and DPRK still have not been able to reach any significant resolution 
and the North Korean nuclear weapons program remains alive and well today.73  
C. CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
Today, the DPRK has overtly displayed its ballistic capabilities on many occasions 
and has provided adequate evidence of its ability to produce nuclear weapons. However, 
Kristensen and Norris posit that there are several crucial details that remain unclear 
regarding its ability to deliver a nuclear warhead via an Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBM) into the Continental U.S. (CONUS). Over the decades, the DPRK developed a 
robust arsenal of ballistic missiles, comprising close, short, medium, intermediate, long, 
and intercontinental range missiles.74 By observing North Korean missile tests, experts 
have been able to determine with relative certainty the projected range of these missiles. 
To date, the DPRK has developed several ICBMs: the Taepo Dong-2, Hwasong-13, 
Hwasong-14, and Hwasong-15. In light of these models, experts assess that the North has 
the capability to attack not only our allies in the Pacific, but possibly hit targets anywhere 
within CONUS.75 However, intelligence experts beleive that North Korea may only 
possess one medium-range ballistic missile, the Hwasong-7 (Nodong), that has the ability 
to actually deliver a nuclear warhead to a desired target.76 Ultimately, the DPRK has yet 
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to provide adequate evidence that it can outfit an ICBM with a nuclear warhead and achieve 
reentry to hit a target within the CONUS.77  
There is significantly more obscurity surrounding North Korea’s current nuclear 
capabilities, including the number of devices, their yield, and where they are stored. 
According to Kristensen and Norris, since 2006, there have been a total of six known 
nuclear tests, each providing increasingly more convincing evidence of the DPRK’s ability 
to produce nuclear weapons. Notably, the nuclear test that took place on September 3, 
2017, involved a nuclear explosion with an estimated yield of 140 to 250 kilotons. This not 
only confirmed the North’s ability to produce nuclear weapons beyond a doubt, but also 
clearly demonstrated enormous technological progress since the weapon displayed traits of 
a thermonuclear design, which U.S. intelligence experts consider to be characteristic of an 
“advanced nuclear device.”78 However, what remains unclear is the amount of fissile 
material that the DPRK has accumulated over the years, the rate at which it is able to 
produce this fissile material, and the number of fully constructed nuclear weapons currently 
in its arsenal. In July 2017, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment concluded 
that North Korea possessed enough fissile material to produce up to 60 nuclear warheads 
and had successfully developed the technology to miniaturize nuclear weapons to be fitted 
onto ballistic missiles. However, another report released shortly thereafter discounted this 
assessment, stating that the DPRK possessed the nuclear resources required to produce 16 
to 32 nuclear weapons.79 Ultimately, the current assessment of the DPRK’s current nuclear 
arsenal continues to be shrouded in uncertainty.  
D. IMPLICATIONS  
Today, the DPRK is closely followed by the nonproliferation regime, as it ranks 
high on the list of countries that potential nuclear aspirants may contact for nuclear-related 
support.80 While evidence of this remains limited, there are serious implications regarding 
                                                 
77 Kristensen and Norris, 44. 
78 Kristensen and Norris, 47–48. 
79 Kristensen and Norris, 47. 
80 Bunn et al., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology, 63. 
29 
the possibility of the North facilitating increased nuclear proliferation on a global scale by 
taking on an A.Q. Khan-like role. The DPRK’s deep involvement in the business of 
exporting illicit goods not only highlights its reliance on illicit revenue, but also serves as 
an indicator that the North may expand its illegal trafficking operations to include nuclear-
related resources in order to increase the flow of revenue to support its economy. Based on 
North Korea’s robust historical record of exporting conventional weapons, ballistic 
missiles and technology, many experts share the following view of Albright, Stricker, and 
Wood:  
The Pyongyang regime occupies a special place as a rogue supplier and has 
demonstrated the capability and inclination to provide nuclear goods and 
capabilities to customers abroad outside normal commerce and despite 
international norms and rules. Based on its current trajectory and absent of 
major breakthroughs through negotiations with the regime or other means 
that lead to fundamental changes in the nuclear policies of the regime, North 
Korea is unlikely to waver from this role in the future. It has long pursued 
goods for its own nuclear programs illegally, while selling nuclear or 
nuclear-related goods to other states.81 
Many experts assert that the DPRK’s heavy reliance on the trafficking of illicit 
goods coupled with its historic record of assisting Syria in building a nuclear reactor and 
providing nuclear-related support to Libya are clear indicators that the North will likely 
expand its illicit nuclear trafficking business in the future for several reasons. Firstly, as 
mentioned before, it is clear that North Korea is willing to export illicit goods to whoever 
is willing to pay, especially since illegal trafficking provides an essential source of revenue 
for its economy.82 Experts furthermore argue that the DPRK relies heavily on illicit 
trafficking to maintain its “power base,” which it will seek to expand by including nuclear-
related material in its black market.83 Lastly, Pyongyang has clearly already established an 
illicit procurement network that proves proficient in circumventing current efforts to halt 
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illicit trafficking. Intelligence experts speculate that these networks can “easily be 
transformed into a supplier network similar to what A.Q. Khan achieved in Pakistan.”84 
With all of this in mind, the nonproliferation strategy towards Pyongyang must continue to 
focus on targeting and thwarting North Korea’s illicit nuclear supply chains. Detecting and 
shutting down these networks will be essential to not only for hindering the DPRK’s steady 
progress in its nuclear and ballistic capabilities, but also to maintaining global stability by 
preventing it from becoming a rogue supplier to countries desiring unsanctioned nuclear 
programs.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Before analyzing the North Korea counterproliferation problem set, it is critical to 
understand the history of the DPRK’s nuclear program and how it persevered through 
decades of the international community attempting to shut it down through negotiations 
and deterrence measures. More specifically, the DPRK has clearly demonstrated 
proficiency in employing elusive political strategies in order to buy time and space to 
obtain the critical resources, technology, and expertise necessary to continue developing 
its nuclear capability. In light of these insights, the current administration must consider 
the likelihood that the DPRK will continue to draw out nuclear negotiations and circumvent 
nonproliferation control measures to improve its nuclear capability and potentially that of 
other nuclear aspirants. The DPRK’s ability to produce nuclear weapons, coupled with the 
clear indicators that it possesses ICBMs capable of ranging the CONUS, strongly suggests 
that Pyongyang will develop the ability to deliver a nuclear warhead to the U.S. homeland.  
Given the DPRK’s economic challenges, another noteworthy danger is the 
possibility of it becoming the next major rogue supplier of nuclear resources to future 
nuclear aspirants. As mentioned before, Pyongyang has not only demonstrated its 
willingness to do illicit business with whoever is willing to pay, but that it desperately relies 
on this illegal revenue for economic survival. With this in mind, identifying shortcomings 
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in the current counterproliferation strategy against the DPRK and developing solutions to 
remediate these vulnerabilities is critically time sensitive.  
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III. ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT NETWORKS 101 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The historical overview of the DPRK’s nuclear program clearly demonstrates the 
instrumental role of illicit procurement networks in its inception and development. The fact 
that stringent economic sanctions are currently the weapon of choice for nuclear policy 
towards North Korea makes these illicit nuclear supply chains increasingly invaluable for 
the maintenance and continued development of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability. 
Furthermore, targeting its primary vehicle for nuclear trafficking is arguably the most 
effective means to hamper its ability to provide nuclear support to future aspirants. Thus, 
this study proposes the application of USSOF as an effective way to enhance efforts to 
target and shut down the DPRK’s nuclear supply chains. To begin the analysis of the 
potential application of USSOF, it is necessary to examine and understand all facets of 
illegal trafficking operations, such as network structure and operating procedures. This 
chapter will introduce this foundational knowledge, moving on to explore the various 
organizations and entities involved in the pursuit of uncovering of and shutting down of 
illicit nuclear procurement networks. This chapter will highlight the key vulnerabilities 
common to all illicit nuclear procurement networks and the shortcomings of 
nonproliferation organizations designed to target them. This analysis will establish the 
point of departure for the discussion on implementing SOF to enhance efforts to illuminate 
the DPRK’s illicit nuclear trafficking operations.  
B. NETWORK STRUCTURE 
In order to circumvent increasingly stringent economic sanctions and export control 
measures, illicit nuclear procurement networks have grown significantly more complex. 
However, the fundamental components essential to nuclear smuggling operations remain 
the same. This section will focus primarily on major network components and investigate 
how these components may be viewed as vulnerabilities for targeting purposes. I will then 
examine how these components manifest themselves in the DPRK’s illicit nuclear 
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procurement network, ultimately seeking to highlight potential vulnerabilities SOF can 
target in order to uncover North Korean nuclear supply chains. .  
According to Albright, Stricker, and Wood, the two primary components of a 
nuclear smuggling network are referred to as nodes and hubs. They explain that the 
following entities or components commonly operate as a node or a hub, and nuclear supply 
chains generally have some or all of them:  
1. A state nuclear program or complex which compiles lists of needed 
goods 
2. A domestic nuclear procurement organization which receives the lists of 
needed equipment from the state nuclear programs and organizes their 
procurement domestically and abroad 
3. Often domestic front or trading companies working under contract for 
the nuclear procurement organization to obtain goods 
4. Other front or trading companies or middlemen/brokers usually located 
abroad and further removed from the nuclear procurement organization, 
which are hired by the domestic front or trading company or the nuclear 
procurement organization for the purpose of placing orders for goods 
5. Suppliers of goods 
6. Intermediaries involved in shipping and logistics 
7. Banks, financial institutions, or informal payment structures which 
wittingly or unwittingly facilitate financing for the goods.85  
It is important to note the key distinctions between nodes and hubs. Essentially, 
nodes interact with one another through actions such as orders, shipments, and inquiries 
for illicit material. Nodes with large volumes of interactions passing through are considered 
hubs. Examples include a nuclear program, entities engaged in procuring materials, and 
trading companies, as well as institutions involved in the shipping, transit, and financing 
of such materials.86 Ultimately, a nuclear smuggling network cannot operate without nodes 
and hubs executing the aforementioned interactions, which makes these components viable 
targets that can cripple nuclear trafficking operations. Furthermore, as evidenced by the 
A.Q. Khan case, uncovering even one node or hub could eventually lead to the exposure 
of a vast nuclear smuggling operation. Thus, significant time and resources should be 
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devoted to identifying particularly vulnerable nodes and hubs within the DPRK’s illicit 
supply chains. 
Arguably the most important nodes and hubs of illicit nuclear trafficking networks 
are “turntable countries,” which function as “transshipment points” to add layers of 
separation between the original supplier and the end user. Such countries tend to have either 
weak or no export control measures, which allows them to serve as critical nodes and hubs 
to facilitate finance and transportation of illicit goods.87 According to Albright, Stricker, 
and Wood, the following regions are involved, unwittingly or wittingly, in nuclear 
smuggling operations:   
• Asia: Malaysia, Hong Kong, China, India, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
Singapore 
• Europe: South East Europe (Albania, Serbia), Bulgaria 
• Middle East and Africa: Oman, Turkey, UAE, Egypt, Tunisia, South 
Africa 
• Central Asia 
• Americas: important sea ports in the Caribbean and Central America, 
Panama, Venezuela 
• Sudan, or other countries with ties to terrorist groups or that are ranked 
very low in the Corruption Perceptions Index.88  
The majority of these countries, with the help of various nonproliferation 
organizations, have taken steps to improve their export controls and regulations in order to 
hamper the flow of illicit nuclear and nuclear related material.89 SOF maintains strong 
historic relationships with the vast majority of these countries, which can be leveraged to 
create opportunities to increase situational awareness of potential nuclear trafficking 
operations and BPC with regards to counterproliferation and counter weapons of mass 
destruction skillsets.  
The last major component critical to all illicit nuclear procurement networks are the 
financial institutions through which the end users, middlemen, and suppliers send and 
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receive payment because nuclear smugglers rarely utilize cash to obtain goods, they 
coordinate with front companies, intermediaries, and trade companies to make currency 
exchange appear to be legitimate. Third parties involved in the movement of illicit nuclear 
goods are typically legitimate businesses and thus, the exchange of payment must appear 
to be legal and routine. In the majority of cases, routing money from customers to suppliers 
is a complex process involving multiple banks and businesses across international 
borders.90 Just as the components involved in the transportation of illicit products are all 
critical vulnerabilities in illicit nuclear procurement networks, compromising these 
financial mechanisms can severely cripple nuclear smuggling operations if compromised. 
Thus, collaborative efforts with key partner forces and governments should be made to 
identify such key financial entities, particularly those located in turntable countries.  
The U.S. and United Nations (UN) maintain strong diplomatic relationships with 
many of these countries, which could serve as a means to enhance their counterproliferation 
efforts, increase collaboration and support, and share intelligence – all of which will 
ultimately increase the probability of uncovering North Korea’s illicit nuclear supply 
chains. Ultimately, this analysis will identify potential focus areas in which SOF can 
leverage its unique mission set and capabilities, historic relationship with allied partners, 
and operational authorities to enhance targeting efforts of North Korea’s illegal nuclear 
supply chains.  
C. OPERATING PROCEDURES 
Countries pursuing unsanctioned nuclear weapons programs, as well as those 
supporting such endeavors, utilize illicit supply chains as the primary means to bypass 
export laws.91 It is common for suppliers to inundate certain countries with an 
overwhelming volume of trade in order to facilitate the passage of illicit nuclear goods. 
Ultimately, the suppliers will route their illicit goods through multiple nodes and hubs in 
order to increase the degrees of separation between themselves and the end user.92 In most 
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cases, agents operating within the turntable countries work with the suppliers and end users 
to coordinate the complex chain of front, shipping, and trade companies to transport the 
products in a discreet manner.93 Albright, Stricker, and Wood cite Iran’s exploitation of 
countries within the European Union (EU) as an example. In this particular instance, Iran 
coordinated for an agent operating within the EU to buy nuclear-related goods from another 
country within the EU to avoid the need for an export license, making the transactions 
appear inconspicuous. Iranian smuggling operatives continued this process within the EU 
until conditions were favorable to smuggle the goods back to Iran.94  
Over the decades, illicit nuclear procurement networks have continuously refined 
their smuggling operations and have become exceedingly proficient in foiling the efforts 
of the U.S. and other nonproliferation-focused entities. This issue has been exacerbated by 
the increased interconnectedness of the modern global market, which encourages actors 
seeking illicit nuclear material to turn to established procurement networks rather than 
attempting to produce them indigenously.95 In other words, these networks can save future 
nuclear aspirants years in their pursuit of nuclear weapons programs.96 The increased ease 
of international travel, enhanced communications technology, and the increased number of 
industrialized countries capable of producing dual use items have enabled smugglers to 
obtain, obscure, and transfer critical items.97 Ultimately, all of these factors have made 
targeting and uncovering the aforementioned critical components of illicit smuggling 
networks increasingly difficult. This supports my argument that policymakers, the 
nonproliferation regime, domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, and all entities 
involved in nonproliferation efforts towards the DPRK should leverage SOF’s global 
footprint and historic partnered relationships to enhance efforts as a means to enhance 
awareness of potential illicit nuclear trade operations taking place in key countries.  
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D. KEY ORGANIZATIONS 
A myriad of organizations with a wide spectrum of specialties are focused on 
preventing the DPRK from obtaining and proliferating nuclear material and knowhow. 
Certain agencies aim to improve countries’ export control measures and the 
implementation of UN sanctions, while others seek to uncover and illuminate the key 
components of illicit nuclear trafficking networks. This section will present an overview 
of key organizations and their major contributions. More importantly, this section will 
highlight these organizations’ weaknesses and shortcomings in order to identify areas in 
which SOF can potentially be integrated to enhance their efforts.  
This section will focus on four entities with a major role in nonproliferation efforts 
towards the DPRK. The IAEA, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the NSG, 
and the PSI all take different approaches to targeting North Korea’s illicit nuclear supply 
chains. Naturally, while all of these organizations have strengths and advantages based on 
their unique missions and authorities, they are all hindered by notable shortcomings as 
well. These will serve as shortcomings will be the key take away from this section as they 
will serve as a point of departure when examining how SOF can not only potentially 
enhance each organizations’ initiatives, but facilitate synchronization and collaboration 
among them as well.  
The IAEA is the only organization charged with the responsibility of maintaining 
awareness of all states’ nuclear programs and confirming that they are utilized exclusively 
for peaceful purposes.98 This organization’s primary method of carrying out its duties 
entails verification of states’ adherence to a series of standards outlined in the 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). The stipulations outlined in the CSA 
ultimately give the IAEA the authority and obligation to verify that all nuclear material in 
a state’s possession is safeguarded and all of its nuclear research and programs are 
dedicated solely to peaceful purposes.99 The IAEA is solely focused on holding states 
accountable to the regulations established by the NPT and CSA through verification; it 
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does not play a significant role in developing and enforcing actual export control 
measures.100  
The IAEA’s strength lies in its comprehensive understanding of the NPT members’ 
nuclear stockpiles and activities. It continues to develop this enormous knowledge base 
through cooperative individuals, industry entities, and countries that are willing to report 
nuclear proliferation-related activities taking place within their borders. Thus, the IAEA 
proves invaluable to the nonproliferation regime as it serves as a bridge among all nuclear 
law-abiding states, an incredibly important function in light of the fact that nuclear 
smuggling operations take place across multiple boundaries.101 Unfortunately, one of the 
IAEA’s most significant weaknesses is its inability to hold violators accountable for not 
operating within the standards outlined by the NPT and CSA. To further complicate 
matters, many NPT members disagree with the safeguards and verification activities, 
ultimately opposing the further expansion of the IAEA’s authorities and activities to 
counter nuclear proliferation.102  
The UNSC is charged with the expansive duty of preserving global peace and 
security. Seeing as unsanctioned nuclear weapons programs have become a significant 
source of global instability over the past few decades, the Council has taken an increasingly 
active role in counterproliferation efforts.103 More specifically, the Security Council’s 
contribution toward efforts to detect and shut down illicit nuclear procurement networks is 
to exercise its authority to “issue resolutions that are legally binding on all UN member 
states.”104 The most prominent example is the UN Security Council passing the UNSCR 
1540 in 2004. This resolution targeted illegal nuclear trafficking networks by forcing all 
member states to increase their awareness and control of nuclear resources that may 
originate within or pass inside their borders. The Security Council determined that the illicit 
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nuclear procurement networks posed a significant threat to international stability, and 
through UNSCR 1540, ordered all members of the UN to develop, establish, and 
implement stringent export, border, and transshipment controls in order to disrupt nuclear 
smuggling operations.105 Additionally, the Security Council passed several resolutions 
that emplaced trade sanctions explicitly prohibiting all member states from participating in 
the trade of nuclear, ballistic, and dual use items with North Korea and Iran.106  
Over time, the vast majority of the UN member states have not only abided by the 
UNSCRs aimed at detecting and hindering illicit nuclear trade, but have actively 
collaborated with the Council and others to strengthen international export and border 
controls. Due to the success of Resolution 1540, the Security Council has passed a series 
of “follow-on resolutions” in order to further restrict illicit nuclear weapons-related 
trade.107 However, the UNSC suffers from the same issue as the IAEA; many member 
states view its resolutions as illegitimate and inappropriate legislation that is unnecessarily 
invasive. Additionally, even for those who agree with the UNSCRs, many states lack the 
capacity to enforce export regulations and have little to no control over trade that passes 
through their borders.108  
The third major organization involved in targeting illicit nuclear trade networks is 
the NSG. Established in 1974, the NSG is comprised of 48 NPT members who voluntarily 
collaborate to counter illicit nuclear trafficking by establishing specific guidelines 
regulating the trade of nuclear, ballistic, and dual use materials.109 More specifically, this 
organization develops and disseminates a comprehensive list of “agreed supply conditions 
and control lists” which UNSCR-abiding countries can reference when implementing 
export and border controls. Ultimately, the NSG’s intent is to ensure that peaceful 
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international trade of nuclear and nuclear-related resources does not facilitate the 
proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons to unsanctioned programs.110  
The NSG’s key function is to provide countries with knowledge of sensitive nuclear 
materials with guidelines that ultimately increase countries’ capacity to detect illicit nuclear 
smuggling operations taking place within and across their borders. Furthermore, the NSG 
provides an excellent source of intelligence for the IAEA and UN Security Council and is 
also an ideal forum for intelligence sharing. The NSG nevertheless shares many of the same 
weaknesses as the IAEA and UNSC: it does not have the ability to prosecute those who 
violate its nuclear guidelines and also struggles with the insufficient capacity of many 
countries to implement these guidelines. Lastly, the rapid improvement of nuclear-related 
technology presents one of the NSG’s major challenges, rendering the ongoing 
maintenance of the list of nuclear resources an extremely difficult task.111 Evolving dual 
use materials desired by nuclear aspirants often evade the NSG’s efforts due to outdated 
control lists.  
Finally, the PSI is similar to the NSG in that it is comprised of NPT member states 
which voluntarily collaborate to detect and halt illicit nuclear trafficking. It was created by 
the Bush administration in 2003 to increase efforts to detect and interdict the shipment of 
nuclear and nuclear-related resources being shipped internationally by land, sea, or air.112 
The PSI takes a different approach to the counterproliferation problem set by focusing its 
efforts on “exercises to test procedures for interdiction; capacity-building; and sharing of 
information in some key cases.”113  
The PSI is an invaluable component of the nuclear strategy towards North Korea 
as it brings countries together with the intent to enhance their ability to physically interdict 
shipments of illicit nuclear material across international borders. The interdiction exercises 
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facilitated by the PSI can be excellent opportunities for partner capacity building with 
regards to interdiction operations, export control measure implementation, and border 
control operations. Unfortunately, despite the dire need to enhance the interdiction 
capabilities of many countries that have fallen victim to the DPRK’s illicit procurement 
networks, the PSI’s effectiveness in fulfilling these functions is greatly hampered because 
few resources have been dedicated towards institutionalizing and globalizing the 
organization and its efforts.114  
Although various other entities are involved in the international struggle against 
nuclear proliferation, this study will focus primarily on the four presented in this section 
for the following reasons. Firstly, not only were they created specifically to target illicit 
nuclear procurement networks, but they were also designed to adopt different approaches 
to countering nuclear proliferation. As a result, these four entities collectively constitute a 
comprehensive approach to combatting nuclear proliferation. For example, the IAEA’s 
comprehensive knowledge of each member states’ nuclear activities paired with the 
UNSC’s ability to enforce nuclear-related rules and standards allows for the development 
of well-informed regulations, which is a critical component of today’s approach to 
targeting illicit nuclear supply chains. Meanwhile, the NSG enables countries to abide by 
UNSC regulations by providing a list of nuclear and nuclear-related items desired by 
nuclear smuggling operations that must be controlled through export and border control 
measures. The PSI complements the other organizations by enhancing countries’ ability to 
halt the movement of the aforementioned illicit nuclear items. Secondly, these 
organizations represent a collaborative effort among all NPT-member states. This matter 
because nuclear trafficking is now a global problem as it takes place across multiple 
international borders. Furthermore, this collaborative effort presents a myriad of BPC 
opportunities critical to enhancing key countries’ ability to enforce export and border 
controls. Despite the many shortcomings  that exist within each of these organizations as 
well as serious downfalls in their ability to collaborate; these vulnerabilities will be key 
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points of departure when exploring ways in which SOF can be integrated into the efforts 
to target the DPRK’s illicit nuclear procurement networks.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines Pakistan’s, Iraq’s, and Iran’s efforts to covertly develop 
unsanctioned nuclear weapons programs by assessing their trafficking methods and 
network infrastructure. These two aspects are most critical to an illicit network’s ability to 
conduct nuclear trafficking operations and therefore, serve as excellent vulnerabilities to 
analyze. These case studies illustrate the key factors that allowed these networks to 
effectively conduct illegal nuclear trafficking despite decades of nonproliferation efforts. 
Ultimately, these parallels, all potential vulnerabilities within the DPRK’s illicit nuclear 
supply chains, will be the foundation of my analysis on how USSOF can augment efforts 
to illuminate North Korea’s illicit nuclear trafficking operations.  
B. CASE STUDY #1: A. Q. KHAN 
Abdul Qadeer Khan, the creator of Pakistan’s nuclear program, was the mastermind 
behind arguably one of the most pervasive nuclear black markets in history. Khan created 
the network because Pakistan’s industrially weak infrastructure lacked the capacity to 
produce the resources and technologies required to develop a nuclear weapons program.115 
He then transformed what started as a series of interconnected suppliers into an 
international business, specializing in the trade of nuclear resources, technologies, and 
expertise to other nuclear aspirants.116 This remarkably expansive network facilitated the 
trade of essential nuclear resources across four continents, providing critical support to the 
U.S.’ major enemies, including Iran, Libya, North Korea, and possibly others. Khan and 
his associates managed to conduct large-scale illicit nuclear trafficking operations 
undetected for nearly two decades despite efforts by the U.S. and its allies to uncover the 
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networks.117 By 2000, U.S. and British intelligence eventually collated sufficient 
intelligence to partially expose the complex network, and by October 2003, the seizure of 
the BBC China, a German vessel transporting components for Libya’s uranium-enrichment 
gas centrifuge facilities, marked the beginning of its unraveling.118  
This discovery was an invaluable learning opportunity for both the nonproliferation 
regime and intelligence agencies with regards to gaining a deeper understanding of illicit 
nuclear supply chains and how such networks managed to operate while avoiding 
detection. This analysis will focus on the key trafficking methods and network 
infrastructure factors that enabled Khan and his associates to operate their nuclear black 
market across the world for two decades without compromise.  
The foundation of Khan’s illicit trafficking operations rested on the use of 
middlemen to acquire critical nuclear components directly from foreign suppliers. This 
acquisition method allowed those operating within the network to buy, sell, and transport 
critical nuclear-related components, while keeping the end users and intended use of the 
items concealed.119 For example, when the network undertook its largest deal with Libya 
in the late 1990s, middlemen obtained and sent required components to Dubai under a 
“false end-user certificate” in order to minimize suspicions of their intended use. The 
components were then consolidated in Dubai, repackaged, and shipped to Libya in support 
of a plan to build gas-centrifuge facilities capable of producing enough enriched uranium 
to outfit up to ten nuclear weapons a year.120 At the height of the network’s operations, 
particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, the A.Q. Khan network employed at least thirty 
companies and associated middlemen in countries operating as key industrial centers and 
logistical hubs for the nuclear black market. Such countries included Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, South 
Africa, and Malaysia; this complex web of interconnected middlemen truly made Khan’s 
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network a transnational organization.121 Ultimately, Khan’s expansive arrangement gave 
the network the agility to circumvent the nonproliferation regime’s efforts to halt its 
trafficking operations.122 Without these middlemen, it is highly unlikely that the network 
would have been able to conceal its high volume of illicit nuclear trafficking. 
In a similar vein, the network’s ability to identify and exploit vulnerable third-party 
countries was also instrumental for concealing its illegal trafficking operations from the 
prying eyes of intelligence agencies and nonproliferation organizations. Many of the 
countries targeted by the Khan network had the industrial capability to manufacture key 
components but had little to no knowledge of the nature of intended their use with regards 
to nuclear-related purposes. For example, Malaysia was integral to Khan’s trafficking 
operations in that it not only had the industrial capacity to produce many sought-after items, 
but also was not a member of the NSG. As a result, the country had limited awareness of 
restricted dual-use items along with poorly enforced export control measures, thereby 
making it an ideal target for the Khan network.123 Even prominent members of the NSG, 
such as Turkey and South Africa, unknowingly supported the Khan network since they 
were permitted to buy and sell components to each other. Ultimately, critical components 
needed for nuclear facilities and weapons were procured from a wide variety of suppliers, 
then consolidated in central logistical hubs such as Dubai, assembled, repackaged, and 
shipped to the end user.124 The network’s exploitation of select third-party countries 
enabled it to employ this decentralized procurement method, which allowed its illicit 
nuclear trafficking operations to flourish despite increased scrutiny. 
The discovery of the Khan network highlights how instrumental these trafficking 
procedures and infrastructure characteristics were to the concealment of its ability to 
provide rogue countries with nuclear-related support. The beginning of the end of Khan’s 
reign over the nuclear black market was the interdiction of the German vessel, the BBC 
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China, which was transporting gas-centrifuge components to Libya. Upon seizure of the 
vessel, Libya abandoned its pursuit of nuclear weapons and cooperated with authorities by 
exposing additional key elements of the Khan network.125 Further investigation revealed 
the involvement of the UAE, South Africa, Turkey, and several European countries–all of 
which cooperated with authorities to further illuminate the transnational trafficking 
network.126 The geographic reach they provided the Khan network highlights the fact that 
the middlemen were instrumental to the concealment of Khan’s operations. Additionally, 
the Libya-bound components aboard the BBC China originated from a Malaysian 
manufacturing company unaware of the intended use of its components and the activities 
of the Khan network. Lastly, the network was discovered largely thanks to collaboration 
between countries, intelligence agencies, and a variety of nonproliferation organizations. 
The U.S., in cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies and nonproliferation 
organizations, closely monitored Khan’s activities as far back as the 1970s.127 Although 
many factors detracted from their efforts to uncover the network, on many occasions, 
several proposals to close down the network were denied in order to give intelligence 
agencies the time and space required to adequately develop a full understanding of the 
Khan network to the fullest extent possible.128 Ultimately, this intelligence collaboration 
and tactical patience eventually led to adequate intelligence to facilitate the successful 
interdiction of the BBC China, which was a joint operation that involved the US, UK, 
Germany, and Italy.129 This also clearly demonstrates the significant role of intelligence 
collectors and the need for sufficient time and space to develop adequate knowledge of a 
complex problem set.  
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C. CASE STUDY #2: IRAQ 
After the bombing of the Osirik reactor in the 1980s, Iraq began developing its 
illicit nuclear procurement network in an effort to obtain its own weapons program. Like 
Pakistan, Iraq lacked the nuclear expertise as well as the capacity to internally produce 
many of the dual-use items that were needed for its gas centrifuge program. Following 
Khan’s footsteps, Iraq depended heavily on foreign experts for nuclear knowhow, third-
party countries for industrial and logistical support, and middlemen for the procurement 
and shipment of critical components.130 One of the most prominent examples involved a 
German company created by Deitrich Hinze and Peter Huetten, also known as H+H 
Metalform, which supported virtually all of these aspects of Iraq’s illicit nuclear 
procurement operations.131 This company specialized in the production of critical dual use 
components required by ballistic and nuclear programs.132 In the late 1980s, Iraq secretly 
acquired 50% of H+H Metalform, and the company and its senior employees thereby 
became procurement agents for Iraq’s illicit nuclear procurement network. More 
specifically, they sold their own equipment to Iraq, facilitated contact with other German 
gas centrifuge experts, and acted as procurement agents for the acquisition of components 
originating from several key countries within Europe.133 Those involved in the H+H 
procurement network made a considerable amount of money supporting Iraq’s illicit 
nuclear supply chain and were primarily driven by financial gain.134  
Moreover, Iraq utilized an extensive network of both domestic and foreign front 
companies in key third-party countries to facilitate the financing and shipment of illicit 
nuclear-related goods. For example, Iraqi agents in Jordan established front companies to 
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coordinate the procurement and flow of materials to customers in Iraq.135 Other third-party 
countries involved in this capacity included Syria, Belarus, and Turkey.136 Iraq’s network 
obscured the end users and intended purpose of dual use components by utilizing numerous 
procurement networks operating independent from one another. Specifically, components 
were acquired from multiple channels in order to avoid raising suspicion of foreign 
intelligence agencies watching for the movement of large quantities of items known to be 
used for nuclear-related purposes;137 see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Iraq Procurement Network138 
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Iraq’s government and associated organizations were heavily involved in its nuclear 
procurement network. Saddam employed virtually every governmental ministry within his 
regime, along with his intelligence agencies, to develop and operate the many components 
of Iraq’s illicit nuclear procurement network.139 Three governmental organizations that 
played a prominent role were the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Oil, and Trade–all of which 
were specifically focused on facilitating the procurement of materials for Iraq’s WMD 
programs. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) exploited its foreign 
government and business contacts to establish illicit trade relationships abroad and also 
provided procurement agents with financial and diplomatic protection.140 Many of the 
Iraqi ministries also served as “false end users” for the dual use items that were funneled 
into the country via its large network of procurement channels. Once received by the 
ministries, the components would then be consolidated and assembled for their intended 
uses within Iraq’s secret nuclear program.141 In a similar fashion, Iraqi intelligence 
agencies used internal assets and foreign contacts to facilitate the procurement of both 
nuclear expertise and dual use components. Specifically, Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) 
agents often set up front companies and to coordinate the transfer of funds for under the 
cover of “commercial attaches” in foreign embassies, highlighting Iraq’s use of embassy 
personnel stationed in foreign countries.142 Such personnel played a heavy role in the 
procurement process, especially in coordinating trade with crucial suppliers throughout 
Europe.143  
D. CASE STUDY #3: IRAN 
In the 1980s, Iran developed an illicit procurement network in order to acquire 
foreign support in nuclear knowhow, technology, and materials from many countries to 
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include China, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, and the U.S.144 
The country’s history of illicit nuclear trafficking presents instances of employing 
governmental and intelligence organizations to facilitate the procurement of prohibited 
nuclear resources, utilizing embassy personnel to create foreign trade relationships with 
key suppliers, using a complex network of front companies and false paperwork to obscure 
the intended receiver and use of illicit resources, and contracting foreign and domestic 
middlemen to operate all of these aspects abroad and at home.145 Regarding the use of 
embassy personnel, historical reports delineate instances of microelectronic components 
intended for nuclear-related use being procured and transshipped out of the Iranian 
embassy in Bonn, Germany. Figure 2 presents a visual depiction of the government entities 
involved in Iran’s illicit procurement network. Notably, the Ministry of Defense and 
Armed Forces Logistics, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Education and 
Research played predominant administrative roles in coordinating the procurement process 
for Iran’s nuclear program.146 
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Figure 2. Illicit Procurement Entities within Iran147 
One specific example involved the Iranian Republic Guard Corps (IRGC) and the 
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). In 1991, the IRGC and AEOI utilized a 
prominent Iranian university, the Sharif University of Technology in Tehran, as a means 
to procure centrifuge components from an Austrian company under the guise of academic 
research. There are many documented instances of Iranian governmental organizations 
exploiting academic institutions in this fashion.148 Also, Iran developed its illicit nuclear 
procurement network by investing in foreign companies capable of producing components 
needed by its enrichment program. In 1987 for example, Iran invested in the Rio Tinto-
Zinc mining company located in Namibia, UAE and may have done the same with the 
German machine-tool manufacturer, Sket Magdeburg, in 1996.149  
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Among the many documented instances of the U.S. and its allies uncovering 
elements of Iran’s illicit nuclear procurement network, the following two cases are 
excellent examples of the country’s use of essentially all of the trafficking methods 
discussed so far. Between September 2007 and June 2013, Nicholas Kaiga, a Belgian 
national, played a prominent role in the procurement and transshipment of dual-use 
components originating from a company based in the U.S. In order to circumvent export 
licensing requirements, a Dubai-based company requested an order of aluminum tubing to 
be shipped to Kaiga’s company located in Belgium. Once Kaiga received the dual-use 
goods, he shipped them to another front company located in Malaysia and then to yet 
another in Dubai. Finally, the goods were exported to their final destination and actual end 
users in Iran. This branch of Iran’s illicit procurement network operated in this manner for 
approximately six years until it was uncovered by U.S. intelligence.150 This case study not 
only demonstrates Iran’s employment of foreign-based middlemen and front companies as 
a means to avoid export obstacles, but also underscores the vast geographic range of the its 
illicit nuclear procurement network.  
Another prominent example involves Parviz Khaki, an Iranian national who was 
arrested on July 13, 2012 for directing an illicit nuclear procurement ring in support of 
Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Iran utilized Khaki’s procurement network to acquire 
dual-use components originating from U.S. and European companies that were used to 
“construct, operate, and maintain gas centrifuges to enrich uranium.” 151Such components 
included “aluminum alloy 150mm rods, mass spectrometers, magnetic tape, measuring 
instruments, pressure transducers, and vacuum pumps,” all of which were critical 
components needed to build and operate gas centrifuges.152 Ultimately, Khaki and his co-
conspirators operating in the Philippines coordinated the purchasing and shipping of 
components to middlemen and front companies located in the Philippines, Hong Kong, and 
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China. In the end, U.S. agents, with the support of the Philippines National Bureau of 
Investigation, arrested Khaki in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in the Philippines 
after sufficient intelligence was gathered by undercover agents posing as middlemen.153 
This case also highlights additional third-party countries exploited to support the 
trafficking of illicit nuclear resources, namely the Philippines, Hong Kong, and China. This 
is particularly important because these countries may already be critical components of the 
DPRK’s illicit supply chains. According to experts, this case study highlights the fact that 
China and other regions of Southeast Asia are “problem zones for export control 
enforcement,” seeing that they played a significant role as logistical hubs for Iran’s 
procurement network.154  
Despite our knowledge of Iran’s trafficking methods through historic instances of 
the U.S. and its allies uncovering Iranian-based nuclear procurement rings, Iran continues 
to be a serious nuclear proliferation threat today. Thus, it is highly likely that there is 
overlap, or possibly mutual support, between Iran’s current nuclear procurement network 
and the DPRK’s illicit nuclear supply chains. To make matters worse, Iran views U.S. and 
U.N. sanctions as unjustified and illegal. As a result, illicit smuggling operations have 
gained political and social acceptance, making it increasingly difficult to uncover nuclear 
procurement networks through cooperation with the Iranian government.155  
E. CASE STUDY #4: NORTH KOREA 
This case study will go into further detail with regard to analyzing its illicit nuclear 
supply chains than the previous three. More specifically, it will not only over the illicit 
supply chains that the DPRK utilized to develop its own prohibited nuclear program, but 
will also discuss how it supported other nuclear aspirants through its nuclear black market. 
Additionally, this case study will further frame the DPRK counterproliferation problem set 
by presenting an assessment of its current ability to indigenously produce resources for its 
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nuclear weapons program. To conclude, this chapter will evaluate the implications of the 
nuclear capabilities discussed and the possibility of the DPRK becoming a rogue supplier 
of illicit nuclear resources similar to the A.Q. Khan network. Ultimately, this final case 
study will be used to highlight key commonalities between the DPRK’s illicit nuclear 
procurement network and those of Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq.  
North Korea is one of the most prominent historical examples of how a country 
utilized illicit trade to obtain the critical resources and expertise needed to develop an 
unsanctioned nuclear weapons program. The DPRK relied illicit networks for the following 
reasons: 1) It did not have the capability to produce them indigenously, 2) Importing the 
goods illicitly was more time and cost efficient, and 3) Other countries were capable of 
producing a higher quality of the desired materials.156 For example, although China is the 
DPRK’s most important trade partner, the quality of these products were not comparable 
to those made in the U.S., Europe, and Japan.157 Examples of such materials include 
“vacuum pumps, fast-acting valves, ring magnets, specialized oils, specialized epoxy 
resins, computerized control equipment, high-grade maraging steel, high-strength 
aluminum, and high-strength carbon fiber,” all of which are critical for the production of 
gas centrifuges.158 However, although China cannot produce the quality required for many 
of these items, it still plays a crucial role in the DPRK’s illicit procurement process by 
receiving such materials from suppliers abroad and then facilitating the financing, sale, and 
transport of these illicit goods into North Korea.159 A deeper look into this process will 
shed light on the key components of the DPRK’s nuclear supply chains. 
The transportation of nuclear-related goods from foreign locations across the globe 
to China or into the DPRK itself is the most fundamental component of North Korea’s 
nuclear trafficking operations. According to the 2012 UN North Korea Panel’s report, most 
illicit nuclear cargo was transported by vessels belonging to large international shipping 
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companies, allowing Pyongyang to acquire critical resources from all around the globe. 
More specifically, this illicit cargo was transported to and from transshipment ports located 
in neighboring countries since mainstream shipping companies did not stop at North 
Korean ports.160 Once the illicit cargo made its way to prominent Chinese ports and 
airfields, it was then sold to the DPRK through Chinese front companies, making the 
transactions appear to be normal domestic sales.161 Evidence also demonstrates that the 
North conducted robust smuggling operations across the Chinese border by exploiting 
China’s loosely enforced import and export control laws and regulations.162  
In 2010, this illicit market, which also included drugs, counterfeit money and 
cigarettes, and conventional weapons and equipment, produced over $3 billion in 
revenue.163 Central to this illicit business was the use of foreign trade companies and front 
companies located in China as well as the massive network of Chinese middlemen 
facilitating the purchase and transport of illicit nuclear goods into the DPRK. These 
middlemen coordinated financing and logistical arrangements with private Chinese or 
foreign firms in order to make these purchases appear ordinary.164 Additionally, as 
interdiction operations increased throughout the years, the DPRK resorted to utilizing its 
own vessels and aircraft to transport goods directly from the supplier’s location back to 
North Korea, avoiding ports known to cooperate with the U.S. For small cargo, North 
Korea has also been known to transport via air with the use of nonstop cargo aircraft and 
utilize cash couriers to avoid sanctions on bank financing.165 For example, evidence 
corroborates that North Korea utilized aircraft to transport used P1 and P2 centrifuges 
supplied by the Khan network in 2000.166 Lastly, there is growing evidence that North 
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Korea’s smuggling methods also involve utilizing its embassies in key foreign countries as 
a means to obtain goods and technologies.167 
The challenge in discovering, mapping, and disrupting these illegal trafficking 
networks lies in their incredibly complex nature as an “interconnected web of buyers and 
sellers,” in which any element discovered by the authorities is simply discarded and 
replaced by another trading company.168 Regardless of the mode of transportation, the 
North Koreans have proved to be experts in “foiling customs inspections” by incorporating 
multiple segments of international shipments, false customs declarations, and falsifying 
paperwork, all in the effort to obscure the origin and destination of illicit materials.169  
North Korea utilizes illicit trafficking for another vital purpose: to generate revenue 
from the sale and export of illicit and legal products, including nuclear-related resources. 
The DPRK has a well-established record of exporting a wide spectrum of illicit goods, 
ranging from counterfeit currency, pharmaceuticals, and narcotics to conventional 
weapons, ballistic technology, and fully-constructed missiles to virtually anyone.170 One 
prominent example is the active procurement network the DPRK established with Iran and 
Syria to regularly export a wide range of conventional weapons such as ballistic missiles 
and technology.171 Another historical example is the DPRK’s blatant disregard of UNSC 
embargos by selling Saddam Hussein missile components and conventional arms.172 In 
2005, the DPRK’s estimated total income from the sale of illicit products and criminal 
activities was $500 million, thereby yielding the same revenue from legitimate arms 
sales.173 Ultimately, these statistics not only highlight the importance of illicit revenue in 
North Korea’s economy, but also demonstrate the DPRK’s proficiency at foiling customs 
regulations as well as import and export laws intended to prevent such illegal sales.  
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Even more worrisome are the several known instances of North Korea utilizing 
illicit trade networks to export critical nuclear resources and expertise to countries aspiring 
to develop nuclear programs. In 2001, the DPRK provided critical support for the 
construction of a secret Syrian reactor by providing reactor designs, expertise, and reactor 
components. More specifically, the DPRK utilized its illicit trafficking networks to procure 
and transport necessary dual use components.174 Another prominent example is the 
DPRK’s support of Libya’s nuclear program. In 2004, the IAEA discovered that North 
Korea supported A.Q. Khan’s network by acting as Libya’s main supplier for uranium 
hexafluoride.175 This support not only demonstrated the North’s willingness to promote 
nuclear proliferation to support programs, but also served as a clear indicator that the 
DPRK was producing enough fissile material to have an excess amount to share with other 
aspirants.  
Thus, the question becomes, to what extent does the DPRK rely on illicit trade 
networks to support its nuclear weapons program and should these networks be the primary 
target of the counterproliferation strategy? While North Korea has demonstrated the 
capability to produce certain components and fissile material indigenously to support its 
program, the 2013 North Korea Panel of Experts report asserts that the North will continue 
to rely on illicit trade for many nuclear and ballistics-related resources due to its economy’s 
lack of  production capacity and the fact that illicit procurement is simply easier and more 
cost efficient.176 Albright, Stricker, and Wood present a comprehensive list of known 
items that the DPRK illicitly imports to support its gas centrifuge program.  
• • Aluminum tubes (low strength for outer casings), ring magnets for use 
in a centrifuge upper bearing, specialized uranium hexafluoride resistant 
oil, epoxy resins used in assembling centrifuge parts (sold commercially 
as Araldite), and a range of equipment important to operating centrifuges 
individually or in cascades, such as vacuum pumps, valves, specialized 
uranium hexafluoride resistant oils, uranium hexafluoride cylinders, 
uranium hexafluoride flow meter, and frequency converters or their 
subcomponents. 
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• • Flow-forming machine usable to make centrifuge rotors and an electron 
beam welder for centrifuge assembly. State-of-the-art computer 
numerically controlled (CNC) machines for making centrifuge parts. 
• • Spare parts for centrifuge-related equipment. 
• • Computerized control equipment used to run a plant composed of 
centrifuge cascades. (The equipment is also used in the petrochemical 
industry, but it was the same as that acquired by Iran to run its 
centrifuges.) 
• • Pressure transducers, which are used to measure the vacuum pressure 
in individual centrifuges and cascades.177  
While there is adequate evidence indicating that the DPRK does not solely rely on 
illicit trafficking networks for fissile material, targeting the flow of the aforementioned 
critical components must be a key strategy of nonproliferation efforts towards North Korea.  
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V. CASE STUDY ASSESSMENT 
This chapter identifies key parallels between the case studies, focusing on the 
trafficking procedures and network infrastructure characteristics that enabled these 
countries to acquire nuclear resources and support. This study assumes that the DPRK has, 
and will continue to employ similar trafficking methods in order to further develop its 
nuclear capabilities and provide support to other nuclear aspirants. The similarities 
highlighted in this chapter will serve as points of departure for the discussion on how and 
where USSOF should be employed to augment efforts to uncover North Korea’s illicit 
supply chains in the following chapter.  
One major characteristic that all four illicit nuclear procurement networks shared 
was their transnational nature. Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea depended on their 
illicit procurement networks for the same fundamental reasons: they were incapable of 
indigenously producing critical nuclear resources and lacked the knowhow necessary to 
develop their unsanctioned weapons programs. Ultimately, this lack of resources and 
knowhow forced each country to look abroad for nuclear-related support via their 
procurement networks. For example, the A.Q. Khan network relied heavily on countries 
such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK, the UAE, Turkey, South Africa, and 
Malaysia for critical nuclear resources.178 Iraq received support from German experts and 
manufacturing companies located in Europe.179 In a similar fashion, Iran relied on 
Germany, France, China, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, and the U.S.180 Lastly, 
the DPRK received support from many of the same third-party entities including the U.S., 
Europe, China, and Japan.181 Thus, these key suppliers and sources of nuclear expertise 
were also key vulnerabilities seeing as they were instrumental to the creation of these 
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prohibited nuclear programs. Furthermore, the fact that many of the same countries appear 
in all four case studies increases the likelihood that they continue to be sources of foreign 
nuclear support for the DPRK.  
Another key commonality these networks shared was the employment of 
middlemen and front companies to facilitate the procurement process of nuclear resources 
originating from these key suppliers and sources of expertise. The primary function of these 
intermediaries is to buy, sell, and transport illicit nuclear resources from suppliers to the 
end user. In all four cases, they coordinated the falsifying of customs declarations and many 
of the other commonly-used trafficking procedures in order to ultimately obscure the end 
user as well as the intended use of these resources. Seeing as it would have been impossible 
for these countries to obtain the resources and technology needed for their prohibited 
weapons without the middlemen and front companies operating in key countries, they are 
also potential vulnerabilities that must be taken into consideration when prioritizing 
USSOF’s targeting efforts to uncover the DPRK’s illicit supply chains.  
The third key commonality was the third-party countries exploited by these 
networks. These third-party countries, also known as “turntable countries,” all served a 
common purpose: they acted as “transshipment points” to add layers of separation between 
the original supplier and the end user. Nonexistent or poorly enforced import and export 
control measures made them ideal nodes and hubs to facilitate the finance and 
transportation of illicit nuclear goods.182 The 2012 UN North Korea Panel’s report stated 
that the majority of the illicit nuclear cargo that supported the development of the DPRK’s 
nuclear weapons program was transported by large international shipping companies with 
transshipment hubs in countries with weak export laws.183 As was the case with the other 
three case studies, these nuclear resources were transported to several intermediary 
countries, with their intended use and end users hidden by falsified customs declarations 
until they reached a neighboring country with lax export controls, at which point they were 
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shipped into North Korea.184 In the case of the DPRK, key turntable countries include 
China, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, and India.185 The 
middlemen and front companies employed by these networks would have been useless had 
they not been able to successfully smuggle nuclear resources out of the countries in which 
they were operating. Thus, these turntable countries were essentially potential choke points 
for the flow of sensitive nuclear materials to and from the DPRK and a key potential 
vulnerability within the DPRK’s illicit supply chains.  
The final parallel that emerges in the analysis of these case studies relates to the 
types of material that were smuggled via the various illicit nuclear procurement networks. 
In all four instances, the smuggling chains were predominantly utilized to procure 
centrifuge-related items that were critical to the development of nuclear enrichment 
facilities. The A.Q. Khan network not only utilized its procurement network to deliver 
individual centrifuge components to buyers, but also to consolidate them in locations where 
they could be constructed and subsequently delivered to customers.186 German centrifuge 
experts procured, consolidated, and delivered critical gas centrifuge parts originating from 
multiple locations within Europe via Iraq’s illicit supply chains to aid the development of 
its prohibited nuclear program.187 In a similar fashion, Iran utilized its transnational 
trafficking network to obtain centrifuge components that were sought after for enrichment 
facilities found in all four case studies.188 Lastly, while there is growing evidence that 
North Korea is capable of indigenously producing the fissile material needed for its nuclear 
weapons program, it still relies on its illicit supply chains for other critical components due 
to insufficient industrial capacity.189 Seeing as the main purpose of the illicit supply chains 
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presented in these case studies were primarily utilized to procure centrifuge-related 
components, it is likely that future nuclear aspirants will reach out to North Korea in pursuit 
of similar. Thus, the presence of such items are strong indicators of North Korean illicit 
nuclear trafficking operations and tracking the presence of centrifuge-related items can be 
instrumental to uncovering the DPRK’s illicit supply chains.  
There are many other parallels within the case studies in addition to the ones 
presented in this chapter. Examples include the involvement of governmental organizations 
and intelligence agencies as well as the employment of embassy personnel to facilitate the 
procurement process of illicit nuclear resources. However, this study will focus primarily 
on the ones addressed in this chapter largely due to the fact that they are vulnerabilities that 
USSOF can realistically target in today’s operating environment. The final chapter of this 
study will delve into further detail on how USSOF can employ its non-kinetic attributes 
and unique mission set to the DPRK problem set in order to target vulnerabilities that may 
exist within North Korea’s illicit nuclear supply chains.  
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VI. INTEGRATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on how SOF’s unique mission set and non-kinetic capabilities 
make it an ideal asset to complement efforts to counter the DPRK’s nuclear procurement 
and proliferation efforts. USSOF is one of the primary means through which the DoD 
ensures that the “U.S., its forces, allies, partners, and interests are neither coerced nor 
attacked with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).”190 More specifically, USSOCOM 
employs SOF to provide all of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) with a 
counter weapons of mass destruction capability and to augment USG efforts to prevent the 
unauthorized use and proliferation of WMD.191  
However, SOF has not historically played a significant role in this regard, making 
the counter weapons of mass destruction mission a vague core task that is often 
misunderstand not only by the employers of SOF, but within its own organizations as well. 
This is largely because political and operational sensitivities as well as administrative 
obstacles often prevent SOF from working directly with many of the entities involved in 
nonproliferation. Such complications can even prevent non-DoD entities from 
collaborating with one another as well. According to Arnold and Salisbury, “U.S. 
counterproliferation law enforcement activities are spread over several agencies with few 
points of integration. This can lead to overlapping objectives, investigations, and 
operations, which can frustrate or undermine overseas enforcement activities.”192 
However, as stated in Joint Publication 3-40: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
successful operations require a “coordinated, whole-of-government effort to curtail the 
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conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD-
related expertise, materials, and technologies.”193  
An essential aspect of this principle is implementing an element capable of 
facilitating collaboration and synchronizing the efforts of all entities involved in the DPRK 
problem set. USSOF is one of the many assets that the DoD contributes to these efforts in 
conjunction with USG departments and agencies as well as various intelligence 
organizations.194 Aaron Arnold expounds upon this by naming a few of the major players 
involved in global nonproliferation efforts and their respective approaches to the DPRK 
problem set. Such organizations include the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Department of Commerce, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Energy, the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the Intelligence Community (IC).195 
Although direct collaboration with many of these entities may not be realistic due to 
political, operational, and administrative obstacles, USSOF still maintains lines of 
communication that can be used to complement nonproliferation initiatives towards North 
Korea.  
B. UNIQUE NON-KINETIC ATTRIBUTES 
USSOF’s inherent “regional, cultural, and linguistic specialties” is developed 
through its foreign language and regional cultural education..196 Arguably, the most 
relevant special operations, with regards to the DPRK problem set, are when SOF 
“assesses, trains, advises, assists, equips (when applicable), and operates with numerous 
Host Nation (HN) forces in joint combined exchange training and other security 
cooperation activities.”197 FID and SFA are two noteworthy core tasks through which 
USSOF employs its unique cultural and regional expertise as a means to enhance the 
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capabilities of the Nation’s allies. FID involves activities to support an ally’s Internal 
Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy, which is intended to protect it from 
“subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their internal security 
and stability.”198 In a similar vein, SFA also falls under the BPC mission category, but 
focuses specifically on assisting a country’s military, law enforcement, coast guard, 
customs officials, intelligence services, and paramilitary forces in ensuring that they can 
“defend against internal and transnational terrorist threats.”199 FID and SFA are clearly 
appropriate SOF missions to apply to the DPRK problem set seeing as North Korea extends 
its nuclear procurement network by exploiting countries that lack the ability to control its 
borders and defend itself from being a part of illicit trafficking operations. These BPC-
focused missions not only serve as a means to enhance key partner forces’ 
counterproliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction capabilities, but can also be 
leveraged to create opportunities to connect select USG departments and agencies, IGO’s, 
and intelligence organizations to key partner forces in need of counterproliferation-related 
resources and training.  
When conducting these BPC-focused core tasks, namely FID and SFA, SOF is 
essentially training indigenous personnel on a set of critical skills in order to develop a 
“self-training capability.”200 One SOF-specific skill set is especially relevant with regard 
to enhancing partner forces’ ability to detect illicit nuclear trafficking operations is Special 
Reconnaissance (SR). SR missions gather and verify “information of strategic or 
operational significance,” which can include area assessments that can help determine 
signs of illicit nuclear trafficking in the instance of the DPRK counterproliferation problem 
set.201 Developing a partner forces’ SR capabilities to specifically target signs of North 
Korean nuclear trafficking is a critical aspect of developing a country’s ability to defend 
itself from being exploited by the DPRK’s illicit trafficking operations. Also noteworthy 
is the fact that SOF are a “capabilities-based force” that specializes in carrying out a variety 
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of special operations in their respective domains, whether it be land, air, or maritime. This 
is especially important because North Korea’s trafficking methods involve transporting 
illicit nuclear material over all three of these domains.  
SOF’s enduring presence in countries vulnerable to the DPRK’s nuclear trafficking 
operations could help nonproliferation organizations to focus their resources and assets 
more effectively, especially when employing initiatives that integrate key partner forces. 
For example, SOF could leverage its historic relationships to create opportunities for key 
partner forces to work with the nonproliferation organizations that are implementing BPC-
focused initiatives. Also, USSOF could also provide accurate assessments of Partner 
Forces’ capabilities, which could help in identifying which foreign forces should receive 
priority in terms of training support and resources.  
In addition to functioning as a bridge to create opportunities for nonproliferation 
organizations to work with key partner forces, SOF can also function as sources of 
invaluable reporting and critical area assessments in countries susceptible to North Korean 
nuclear procurement operations. The fact that USSOF maintains access to many key 
countries through its BPC-focused mission set, can make it a particularly useful asset to 
provide all entities involved in nonproliferation efforts with the information needed to 
maintain accurate situational awareness of the DPRK’s illicit nuclear trafficking 
operations. While SR is a skillset that SOF can teach allies in order to enhance their ability 
to detect signs of the DPRK’s illicit nuclear supply networks, it is also a skill that they can 
execute unilaterally in order to collect and report invaluable intelligence to various 
nonproliferation organizations.  
In addition to SR, another noteworthy capability USSOF brings to the 
nonproliferation fight is referred to as Advanced Force Operations (AFO). While AFO is 
traditionally intended to prepare an environment and assault force for Direct Action (DA) 
operations, they can also include activities such as “close-target reconnaissance, tagging, 
tracking, and locating (TTL).”202 These intelligence collection capabilities could enable 
SOF to support the organizations that maintain databases on foreign nuclear programs and 
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blacklisted dual use components such as the IAEA and the NSG. This SOF-unique 
capability could be leveraged to synchronize the efforts of all organizations involved by 
enhancing situation awareness of an operating environment through the collection and 
reporting of critical nuclear trafficking-related information, gathered from key areas that 
are suspected to be involved in facilitating the DPRK’s illicit nuclear procurement 
operations.  
SOF’s enduring presence in known and potential turntable countries should be 
leveraged to provide the nonproliferation regime accurate and up to date assessments of 
potential trafficking activity. Arguably one of USSOF’s most relevant characteristics with 
regards to targeting the DPRK’s nuclear supply chains is its expansive and enduring 
presence in the vast majority of the Nation’s allied countries across the globe. Through 
regionally-aligned Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC), USSOCOM provides 
all GCCs with the unique capabilities provided by USSOF.203 This global footprint, paired 
with SOF’s ability to execute the aforementioned core tasks and unique skillsets, makes 
USSOF an extremely powerful asset to augment current efforts to uncover the DPRK’s 
illicit supply chains operating abroad.  
C. PROPOSED ROLES OF USSOF IN THE DPRK PROBLEM SET 
1. Enhancing Key Partner Force Capabilities 
SOF’s regional, cultural, and linguistic expertise can create a wide spectrum of 
opportunities to expose elements of the DPRK’s nuclear procurement channels and to 
enhance key countries’ ability to defend themselves against becoming part of these 
procurement networks. Such supplier and turntable countries are a major vulnerability 
within the DPRK’s illicit nuclear procurement network in light of their critical role in the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons-related resources. In the case of the North Korean problem 
set, the entities that wittingly or unwittingly play a major role in North Korean nuclear 
procurement operations include Malaysia, Hong Kong, China, India, Thailand, Taiwan, 
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Vietnam, and Singapore.204 SOF’s primary platforms for interacting with the various 
military, law enforcement, and border patrol forces of these countries are BPC missions 
executed under the umbrella of the FID and SFA core tasks. The most commonly executed 
BPC mission is known as a Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), during which SOF 
accomplishes its own training requirements through the training and exchange of skills 
with HN counterparts.205 The JCET is just one of the many BPC missions available to 
SOF, all of which have their own unique focus, funding, and authorities. Thus, one of the 
primary ways in which SOF can be employed to target North Korea’s reliance on turntable 
countries is to enhance key partner forces’ counterproliferation and counter weapons of 
mass destruction-related capabilities through the execution of BPC missions such as the 
JCET. Ideally, SOF should prioritize their efforts for known turntables countries involved 
in the DPRK’s nuclear procurement network and ensure that the BPC missions executed 
in these countries have a counterproliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction-
focus. Such operations should also focus on training the appropriate partner forces on 
skillsets such as SR and border control operations in order to enhance their ability to 
identify signs of illicit nuclear trafficking operations and to defend their respective 
countries from North Korea’s exploitation efforts. In this way, SOF’s ability to target North 
Korea’s reliance on turntable countries with an indigenous approach makes it an ideal asset 
to contribute to efforts to degrade North Korea’s nuclear proliferation efforts. 
2. Connecting Nonproliferation Organizations and Key Partner Forces 
In a similar vein, BPC missions would enable SOF to target North Korean nuclear 
trafficking channels in key supplier and turntable countries by creating a wide spectrum of 
opportunities to support the various entities involved in nonproliferation efforts. With 
regard to the indigenous approach, SOF could collaborate with subject matter experts from 
the various organizations within the nonproliferation regime to receive training in 
counterproliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction-related skillsets that are not 
taught in USSOF training. In turn, SOF could train key allied nations in dire need of 
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training on their behalf. Also, SOF’s deep historic relationships with many of these 
countries could be leveraged by nonproliferation organizations such as the IAEA, NSG, 
and PSI to create additional opportunities to develop and improve the ability of vulnerable 
countries to detect and degrade North Korean nuclear trafficking operations occurring 
within their borders. For example, SOF could influence these partner forces to participate 
in multi-national counterproliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction-focused 
training exercises, which would be an ideal opportunity for subject matter experts from the 
various nonproliferation entities to share their expertise. Ultimately, SOF should be 
employed as a facilitator and synchronizer to help implement nonproliferation initiatives 
in key turntable countries. 
3. Reporting 
BPC operations also serve as an excellent opportunity to target middlemen and 
front companies, which have been identified as potential critical vulnerabilities within the 
DPRK’s illicit nuclear trafficking operations. When conducting FID or SFA, BPC 
operations are ideal platforms that SOF can utilize to expose these middlemen and front 
companies. The nonproliferation entities that have subject matter expertise on the DPRK’s 
illicit nuclear trafficking operations should leverage USSOF’s access to vulnerable 
countries as well as its unique skillsets as a means to target and expose the middlemen and 
front companies that are essential to the procurement illicit nuclear-weapons related 
resources. Such capabilities include SR, AFO, and TTL–all of which enable SOF to operate 
as an effective sources of invaluable information while operating in key supplier 
countries.206 Through collaboration with select USG departments, intelligence 
organizations, and entities within the nonproliferation regime, SOF could be trained to 
identify, collect, and report telltale signs of the DPRK’s illicit nuclear trafficking 
operations. Operators can be utilized in this manner to also track down highly-trafficked 
dual-use components utilized for centrifuges and other high-demand components for 
nuclear facility and weapon development. In all instances, USSOF’s unique skillsets and 
access to key countries could be leveraged in order to increase the overall awareness of 
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North Korean nuclear trafficking operations. Additionally, SOF should be leveraged to 
develop accurate assessments of the export control measures in relevant countries as well 
as the capacity of partner nation forces to defend their respective countries from being 
exploited by North Korean trafficking operations. Such assessments would enable 
nonproliferation entities to prioritize their efforts and limited resources when working to 
uncover and disrupt the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation efforts.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, USSOF’s unique attributes generate a wide spectrum of 
opportunities to target the DPRK’s illicit nuclear supply chains. In the case that direct 
collection is not possible due to the aforementioned potential obstacles, SOF can still 
provide invaluable intelligence through reporting and create opportunities to connect allied 
nations to nonproliferation organizations focusing on BPC-type initiatives. USSOF’s 
access to key supplier and turntable countries along with its unique skillsets that lend 
themselves particularly well to the counterproliferation and counter weapons of mass 
destruction problem set, makes SOF an excellent addition to the various initiatives 
designed to prevent the DPRK from acquiring and proliferating nuclear resources. While 
the current DPRK-focused nuclear nonproliferation initiatives have garnered a degree of 
success over the decades, the integration of USSOF and its unique capabilities could 





The primary purpose of my thesis was to demonstrate that USSOF could play a 
larger role in the current nuclear nonproliferation strategy towards the DPRK by enhancing 
efforts to uncover its illicit nuclear supply chains. Ultimately, this study asserts that SOF’s 
unique non-kinetic attributes and capabilities can significantly improve efforts to prevent 
it from pursuing ambitions to become the next major supplier of nuclear weapons-related 
resources to rogue aspirants. I dedicated the opening chapters of this study to framing the 
problem and establishing the foundation of my argument. For example, in the literature 
review, I demonstrated that USSOF has historically not played a significant role in 
nonproliferation efforts directed towards Pyongyang and continues to be absent from the 
various solutions proposed by scholars and subject matter experts. I then provided a brief 
synopsis of the history of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and an assessment of 
its current nuclear capabilities for two purposes: 1) to demonstrate that the tumultuous 
history of nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang serves as strong evidence that 
denuclearization is not likely and 2) to highlight the high likelihood that North Korea will 
add nuclear proliferation to its repertoire of black-market operations as a means to generate 
illegal revenue for economic survival. This chapter validated the gravity of the DPRK 
nuclear proliferation problem set and the dire need to revamp the current nuclear policy 
and nonproliferation strategy. To finish framing the problem, I presented a general 
overview of trafficking techniques and infrastructure characteristics adopted by traditional 
illicit nuclear procurement networks in order to highlight components critical to trafficking 
operations. These opening chapters established the foundation of my research 
methodology, which entailed the examination of three countries that successfully 
developed prohibited nuclear weapons programs through the use of illicit procurement 
channels. Most importantly, this chapter identified the trafficking methods and 
infrastructure characteristics that enabled these networks to circumvent nonproliferation 
measures implemented by the nonproliferation regime. I then based the foundation of my 
research methodology on the premise that if these prominent nuclear aspirants 
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implemented these attributes to successfully pursue their nuclear ambitions, then it is 
highly likely that the DPRK will adopt them into its own illicit nuclear trafficking networks 
as well. Furthermore, I argued that these procedures and critical infrastructure 
characteristics should be viewed as potential vulnerabilities in light of their critical role in 
successful illicit trafficking operation. Finally, the closing chapters of my thesis examined 
how these vulnerabilities appear within the DPRK’s illicit nuclear supply chains and go on 
to determine how USSOF can be applied to target them. To conclude, this study argued 
that nonproliferation entities should leverage SOF’s unique attributes and capabilities to 
enhance their efforts to target these vulnerabilities, which may ultimately increase the 
chances of uncovering North Korea’s transnational nuclear supply chains.  
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The key findings of this thesis are predominantly derived from the analysis of the 
four case studies and the chapter discussing USSOF integration, which identifies and 
applies key aspects of SOF to the targeting of vulnerabilities identified within the DPRK’s 
nuclear procurement networks. All three historic illicit nuclear procurement networks 
shared the following characteristics: 1) reliance on key suppliers abroad 2) employment of 
middlemen and front companies, 3) exploitation of third-party countries with poor border 
control measures, and 4) trafficking of dual use components meant for centrifuge facilities. 
Identifying these four parallels allowed me to scope my analysis of USSOF’s 
characteristics and capabilities, specifically to targeting critical components of North 
Korea’s transnational supply chains.  
Chapter VI, which focused on the actual application of USSOF, utilized the 
evidence presented in the North Korea case study to determine how SOF’s unique 
characteristics and capabilities should be applied to target the potential vulnerabilities 
identified within North Korea’s nuclear procurement channels. SOF’s regional expertise, 
deep historic relationships with key partner nations, and unique skillsets enable it to create 
opportunities to implement a variety of approaches to target the key components of 
Pyongyang’s illicit trafficking operations. For example, the DPRK problem set is 
transnational in nature due to the fact that it cannot indigenously produce many of the 
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critical components needed to develop and maintain a nuclear weapons program. 
Regardless of whether this is due to the North’s lack of industrial capacity to produce such 
items or the economic advantages of importing these resources from suppliers abroad, the 
key point is that the DPRK counterproliferation problem set spans an immense 
geographical area. Enhancing partner nations’ capabilities to defend themselves from 
North Korea’s illicit nuclear trafficking operations must be one of the primary pillars of 
the strategy to prevent the DPRK from potentially assuming an A.Q. Khan-like role. In line 
with this logic, Chapter VI highlighted the various unique aspects of USSOF that make it 
an ideal asset to facilitate this indigenous approach to targeting North Korean illicit nuclear 
supply chains.  
Finally, nonproliferation organizations should employ SOF as a means to gather, 
verify, and report indicators of North Korean nuclear trafficking operations. Several 
aspects of SOF enable its operators to be excellent sources of such information. USSOF’s 
regional expertise, historic relationships with allied forces, unique skillsets, and its 
indigenous approach to its mission sets grant it an invaluable attribute that truly makes SOF 
unique, an enduring presence across the globe and access to many key supplier and 
turntable countries that are known to be exploited by the DPRK’s illicit nuclear 
procurement network. Ultimately, if employed properly, USSOF could significantly 
enhance nonproliferation efforts towards North Korea by providing critical information 
and accurate assessments on partner nations’ counterproliferation and counter weapons of 
mass destruction capabilities as well as indicators of North Korean nuclear trafficking 
operations. This proposed role of SOF is critical since resources for nonproliferation efforts 
are limited and must be prioritized accordingly based on which partner nations require the 
most assistance. Furthermore, key organizations within the nonproliferation regime, such 
as the IAEA, NSG, and PSI, could collaborate with one another as well and with USSOF 
to train operators on identifying tell-tale signs of illicit nuclear trafficking operations. For 
example, one of the major indicators highlighted in this study is the presence of dual use 
components that can be utilized for centrifuge facilities designed to enrich fissile material 
for nuclear weapons. SOF could not only unilaterally apply its unique skillsets to report 
the presence of such material, but could also enhance partner nation forces’ ability to do so 
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as well. Ultimately, if employed in this capacity, SOF could help generate improvements 
in the nonproliferation strategy towards North Korea by synchronizing and prioritizing the 
efforts of all entities involved in preventing the DPRK from becoming the next major 
international nuclear proliferator.  
C. THE WAY AHEAD 
The fact that North Korea continues to threaten global stability with its nuclear 
weapons program is a clear indicator that the current strategy to thwart its nuclear 
ambitions is inadequate. Furthermore, in light of the long history of failed nuclear 
negotiations with Pyongyang, along with the possibility that it may increase its nuclear 
proliferation activity for economic reasons, the U.S. and its allies must make efforts to 
enhance the strategy to combat North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The proposals set forth 
in this study are realistic and feasible seeing as SOF currently operates and maintains an 
enduring presence in many of the vulnerable countries associated with Pyongyang’s illicit 
trafficking activities. While there are certainly administrative issues and legal 
complications that can arise from employing USSOF in conjunction with the various 
nonproliferation organizations mentioned in this study, there should at least be 
collaboration in training environments in order to enhance SOF’s ability to train partner 
nations on counterproliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction -related skillsets 
and to unilaterally provide invaluable information while operating in these high-risk 
countries. Most importantly, taking steps to implement the proposals outlined in this thesis 
will provide increased clarity on SOF’s counterproliferation and counter weapons of mass 
destruction mission set at the tactical level as well as at higher governmental levels, which 
is absolutely imperative to the proper employment of SOF.  
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
One major issue that arises from the integration of USSOF stems from the 
administrative issues and legal complications associated with the various operational 
authorities and funding allotments that are granted to each respective nonproliferation 
entity and the numerous platforms utilized to approach the DPRK counterproliferation 
problem set. U.S. Code (USC) Title 10 specifically grants the authorities and funding that 
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allow USSOF to implement its unique indigenous approach to operations through its BPC-
focused mission sets. Section 322 of USC Title 10 states that these authorities and funding 
lines are only available to SOF personnel assigned to USSOCOM for the purpose of 
training with friendly foreign forces.207 The overarching problem is that this stipulation 
does not permit the participation of various foreign and domestic organizations that focus 
specifically on global nonproliferation initiatives. The prime examples mentioned in this 
study include organizations such as the IAEA, NSG, PSI, along with the various USG and 
intelligence agencies involved in the DPRK problem set. Unfortunately, this precludes the 
participation of invaluable subject matter experts in BPC missions, which present ideal 
opportunities to enhance partner nations’ capabilities. Thus, one of the key areas for future 
research should explore the means to enable SOF to execute counterproliferation and 
counter weapons of mass destruction -related tasks in conjunction with the aforementioned 
nonproliferation elements in an operational setting with key partner forces.  
In a similar vein, another area for future research concerns opportunities for SOF 
to train with nonproliferation regime organizations in the case that collaboration in an 
operational environment is not feasible. As mentioned before, such training environments 
would be an excellent venue to facilitate collaboration to enhance SOF’s ability to provide 
critical nuclear trafficking-related information while operating in countries that may be a 
part of North Korea’s illicit nuclear trafficking operations. Additionally, identifying 
multinational training events to facilitate collaboration among key partner nations would 
be an important area for future research. Such training events could potentially be ideal 
venues to develop relationships between nonproliferation organizations and turntable 
countries in need of their expertise. Lastly, further research should be done to determine 
which countries currently play the most vital roles within North Korean illicit nuclear 
supply chains as well as those most vulnerable to being exploited by the DPRK in the 
future. The outputs from this research will facilitate the prioritization of targeting efforts 
and allocation of limited resources to the DPRK counterproliferation problem set.  
                                                 





In his article “Stopping Proliferation Before It Starts,” Gregory Schultz asserts that 
based on the tumultuous history of nuclear negotiations with North Korea, it is unlikely 
that Pyongyang will agree to denuclearize and abandon its nuclear ambitions in the near 
future. In line with this point, he goes on to posit that the current administration and 
nonproliferation organizations should focus their efforts on containing the North Korean 
nuclear threat.208 Although all previous attempts to halt the DPRK’s nuclear progress have 
ultimately failed, this study clearly demonstrates that SOF is a realistic option that can 
make vast improvements to future efforts to prevent North Korea from becoming the next 
major supplier of illicit nuclear resources. The evidence presented in this study 
demonstrates the distinct possibility that weaker state and non-state actors will follow 
North Korea’s footsteps and look to obtain nuclear weapons as a means to garner 
geopolitical clout. Thus, it is imperative that all available instruments of national power 
are implemented to improve the nuclear policy that is in place to prevent the possibility of 
North Korea taking on an A.Q. Khan-like role in the future. As demonstrated in this thesis, 
USSOF is one among the many options available, one which could significantly enhance 
efforts to target and uncover the DPRK’s illicit supply lines.  
                                                 
208 Schulte, “Stopping Proliferation before It Starts: How to Prevent the Next Nuclear Wave,” 95. 
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